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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
1. Singapore and Hong Kong share many similarities in their growth experiences 
and challenges.  Both were traditionally entrepot economies and service hubs 
for their hinterlands – China for Hong Kong, and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), in general but Malaysia and Indonesia in particular, 
in the case of Singapore.   
 
2. The two economies have gone through major structural changes over the years 
in response to changes in the global economy and in their relationships with 
their respective hinterlands.  The changing relationships with their hinterlands 
play a crucial role in driving their external economic policies. 
 
3. In Hong Kong’s case, China dominates the economic landscape. Increased 
economic integration with China over the years has led to a sharp de-
industrialisation of Hong Kong, with the services sector now accounting for 
92% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As Hong Kong remains largely a 
laissez faire economy, much of the restructuring in the economy is driven by 
the private sector.   
 
4. The Chinese government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR) government have however facilitated the integration process by 
easing the rules on the movement of goods and services as well as capital and 
labour.  The Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between 
mainland China and Hong Kong has helped deepen the economic integration 
considerably. 
 
5. Unlike Hong Kong, Singapore has a complex relationship with its hinterland, 
the ASEAN countries. Vast differences in historical, cultural and political 
backgrounds make occasional misunderstanding unavoidable. Different 
economic structures and policy priorities and agenda further complicate such a 
relationship. Managing this complex relationship represents an important part 
of Singapore’s economic cooperation policy with ASEAN.   
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6. Furthermore, the Singapore government adopts a highly interventionist stance 
in the economy. The economic cooperation policy with ASEAN and hence the 
management of the relationship with ASEAN change with the changing 
structure of the domestic economy. The private sector plays a relatively 
passive role in this process. 
 
7. In general, Singapore has adopted a two-pronged approach in its external 
economic cooperation policy. It plays an active role in fostering closer 
ASEAN economic ties while continuing to maintain close trade and 
investment relations with other economies. The balance between the emphases 
shifted over time as the importance of ASEAN as a source of economic 
growth for Singapore changes.  
 
8. In the earlier phases of ASEAN’s existence, when the grouping was focusing 
more on political cooperation than economic cooperation, Singapore took a 
“global” rather than “regional” stance in its external economic strategy. After 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Singapore became much more pro-active in its 
economic integration with ASEAN. This came partly as a realisation of the 
importance of concerted region-wide responses to external shocks and partly 
as countermeasures to the new challenges posed by the rise of the Chinese and 
Indian economies. 
 
9. The experience of Singapore’s external economic strategy demonstrates the 
need for economies to constantly review their external strategy to support their 
overall economic development objectives. Singapore’s linkages with advanced 
countries in the West provide the market for its export-oriented policy, while 
its engagement with countries in the region facilitates the building of its 
“external wing” for economic growth. 
 
10. Hong Kong also has “two doors” for its economic growth:  the China 
hinterland and the international/regional markets.  Closer economic relations 
with ASEAN would help open another “door” for Hong Kong and provide a 
new source of economic growth that is independent of the Chinese hinterland.  
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11. ASEAN could provide an important export market for goods and services 
from Hong Kong. It could also be the destination for the relocation of Hong 
Kong-owned production facilities in China. With a well thought out strategy, 
ASEAN could allow Hong Kong to move away from its heavy reliance on the 
Chinese economy.  
 
12. Hong Kong has not been an active economic partner of ASEAN thus far.  
Nonetheless, ASEAN countries are ready for a bigger and more active Hong 
Kong presence in the region.  Singapore’s experience in engaging the ASEAN 
economies could be instructive for Hong Kong. 
 
13. As a neutral economic partner without any historical or political baggage, 
Hong Kong may enjoy certain advantages over Singapore which could help 
considerably ease the task of relationship management. There is strong 
motivation on the part of the ASEAN Secretariat to deepen ASEAN’s 
relationship with not just China as a whole, but also individual provinces such 
as Guangdong and the HKSAR. 
 
14. It is important for Hong Kong to understand the diverse nature and structure of 
the ASEAN economies and the dynamics of the relationship between them.  
They do not represent a single monolithic entity. Managing the relationship 
with each ASEAN economy requires a slightly different approach.  
 
15. Hong Kong could engage ASEAN through various means. It could start an 
active dialogue with the ASEAN Secretariat or explore how it could work with 
Beijing to take advantage of existing linkages between China and ASEAN 
such as the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) framework. 
 
16. As Hong Kong is already a member of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Forum (APEC) and Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), to which 
most ASEAN countries belong too, Hong Kong could use these channels to 
advocate or support initiatives that facilitate economic interactions between 
these organisations and ASEAN. The Hong Kong government can also 
enhance the activities of its own trade-related departments such as the Hong 
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Kong Economic and Trade Office (HKETO) and the Hong Kong Trade 
Development Council (HKTDC) to increase trade and investment cooperation 
with ASEAN. 
 
17. Close collaboration between the government and large corporations 
(especially the Government-linked-Companies (GLCs)), often with the 
involvement of International Enterprise (IE) Singapore – a statutory board 
within the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) charged with promoting 
Singapore’s overseas trade and investment activities – has been effective in 
opening new markets within and beyond ASEAN for Singapore businesses.  
 
18. While there is no reason for Hong Kong government to deviate from the 
laissez faire philosophy that has worked so well for its economy, it might want 
to look more closely at the mode of collaboration between the government and 
private sector in Singapore, working through HKETO, HKTDC and other 
relevant entities. 
 
19. Non-government trade and business associations in Hong Kong such as the 
Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce could also be encouraged to play 
a more active role in fostering ties with their counterparts in ASEAN by 
organising more visits to and trade exhibitions in ASEAN. Channels should 
also be established so that these associations could seek ways to work with 
government bodies such as HKTDC to help facilitate the exchanges.  
 
20. Just like how Singapore has been serving as a bridge between ASEAN and 
non-ASEAN economies for “supra-regional” ASEAN activities such as the 
“ASEAN plus” framework (e.g. ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, etc.), Hong Kong can 
also raised its level of participation in ASEAN by being the “dragon-head” of 
China’s own sub-regional arrangements such as the “Pan-Pearl River Delta 
Economic Cooperation” (9 + 2) and the “Beibu Gulf Rim Economic Circle” 
for ASEAN.  It could also serve as a bridge for China to expand their ventures 
(zou-chu-qu) to Southeast Asia. 
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21. Hong Kong could also take an active role in sub-regional economic initiatives 
within ASEAN, such as the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), as Singapore 
has done. Likewise, it could expand its bilateral engagement with other 
ASEAN states through city-to-city (C2C) cooperation. Hong Kong possesses 
rich experiences in city governance and in providing solutions to urban 
challenges.  
 
22. As part of its efforts to increase understanding between the people of Hong 
Kong and ASEAN, which is crucial for maintaining strong economic ties in 
the long run, Hong Kong could consider spending more resources on 
promoting its cultural, educational and social linkages with ASEAN. It could 
start with placing a greater emphasis on ASEAN studies at tertiary institutions 
and to promote tourism between Hong Kong and ASEAN. 
 
23. There are huge business opportunities within ASEAN for Hong Kong to 
explore. There should be more active interaction between the two sides, both 
at the official level and in the private sector. Given the many similarities 
between Hong Kong and Singapore, a better understanding of Singapore’s 
experience in managing its economic relationship with ASEAN could 
potentially be very helpful in helping Hong Kong to increase the level of 
engagement with ASEAN. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview 
 
1.1. On 16 December 2008, the East Asian Institute (EAI) of the National 
University of Singapore and the Central Policy Unit of the Government of the 
HKSAR signed a consultancy agreement for the former to carry out a study on 
Singapore’s experience in regional cooperation.  This report is the findings of the 
study.   
 
1.2. The report contains an introduction and three parts.  The introduction lists 
out the research objectives, scope, structure, and methodology of this study.  A 
description of the sources of literature reviewed or consulted is also included in the 
introduction. 
 
1.3. Part I of this report discusses the evolution of Singapore’s regional economic 
linkages and integration policies.  The analysis for this part is formed by first 
reviewing the trade and investment pattern of Singapore in the ASEAN region from 
1965 to 2007.  This is followed by a study on the various policies introduced by the 
Singapore government during the same period.  Findings in this part will show the 
role of the government in formulating Singapore’s strategy on integration with the 
regional economy.  Part I ends with a discussion on how Singapore serves as a 
conduit for the ASEAN region to the global economy. 
 
1.4. Part II of the study explains the dynamics of Singapore’s changing role in 
regional integration.  It shows how Singapore formulates its regional integration 
policies and ASEAN’s perception of Singapore in facilitating integration within 
ASEAN.  The findings in this part are based on the Institute’s interviews with 
government officials and scholars from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and 
China’s Yunnan province. 
 
1.5. Part III of this report synthesises the findings of Part I and Part II by 
examining Singapore’s experience in regional integration and studying how the 
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approaches may be relevant to Hong Kong.  It provides a set of recommendations on 
how Hong Kong can enhance its own regional linkages. 
 
Research Objectives and Scope 
 
Research Objectives 
 
1.6. The study on Singapore’s experience in regional cooperation is undertaken 
with the following objectives: 
 
(a)    To carry out a review on the policies and practices of Singapore in 
regional cooperation including economic and trade cooperation with an 
insider’s comparative perspective and 
 
(b)   To assess the applicability of relevant policies and practices on 
regional cooperation for Hong Kong. 
 
 
Scope of the Study 
 
1.7. The scope of the study will cover the following: 
 
(a) The role and importance of regional cooperation in the overall 
development strategy of Singapore; 
 
(b) The rationale behind the strategies and specific measures taken by 
Singapore in regional cooperation; 
 
(c) Singapore’s strategies in negotiating regional trade agreements and 
bilateral trade agreements including the criteria for choosing partners 
and the scope of negotiations; 
 
(d) The strategies and policy measures for Hong Kong to consider in 
launching its own regional cooperation endeavour with reference to the 
Singaporean experience/model; and 
 
(e) Recommendations to Hong Kong’s participation in regional 
cooperation through China or through its sub-regional cooperation 
schemes such as the Beibu Gulf Rim Economic Circle. 
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Structure of the Study 
 
1.8. The study includes: 
 
Part I: Evolution of Singapore’s regional economic linkages and integration policies 
 
1. Changing profiles of Singapore’s trade and investment pattern with the region: 
 
(a) Early economic development policy including Singapore’s entrepot 
position in Southeast Asia and reliance on Malaysia/Indonesia as 
hinterland. 
 
(b) Establishment and evolution of ASEAN: from political initiative to 
economic cooperation through ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
(AFTA). 
 
(c) Singapore’s expanded regional economic linkages beyond ASEAN 
(e.g. ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 and other sub-regional cooperation 
schemes such as the GMS Economic Cooperation Programme and the 
Beibu Gulf Rim Economic Circle). 
 
2. Major policy initiatives to promote Singapore’s integration with the region: 
 
(a) Political dimension of Singapore’s regionalisation moves (ASEAN and 
beyond, especially increased emphasis on China and India). 
 
(b) Strategies to expand regional linkages. 
 
(c) Private sector initiatives. 
 
3. Singapore’s role and contribution to regional integration: How Singapore 
serves as a conduit for the region to the global economy and complementing the 
comparative advantages of the region. 
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Part II: Dynamics of Singapore’s changing role in regional integration 
 
1.9. This section will provide insights on: 
 
(a) How Singapore formulates its regional integration policies and the 
major considerations and constraints it faces; why and how it changes 
its policy emphasis over time; 
 
(b) How the other countries in the region, especially ASEAN countries, 
view the role and contribution of Singapore to regional economic 
integration; and how Singapore in turn works with the diverse 
expectations of these other countries.   
 
1.10. This section will be built on interviews conducted with key policy makers 
and private sector players, both within Singapore and in other key countries in the 
region, who have been intimately involved in Singapore’s regional integration 
initiatives. These interviews will provide new insights that secondary writings and 
official statistics will not be able to reflect. 
 
Part III: Relevance of Singapore’s experience for Hong Kong 
 
1.11. This section examines how Singapore’s experience in regional integration 
and its policy approaches may be relevant to Hong Kong, as the latter seeks to 
enhance its own regional linkages.  Specifically, it will: 
 
(a) Focus on issues that are common to both Singapore and Hong Kong, 
including their reliance on the neighbouring economies as the 
economic hinterland (ASEAN for Singapore and the Mainland China 
for Hong Kong), and their distinctive status as “small city-economies”.  
 
(b) Address the relevance of Singapore’s broad policy as well as specific 
sub-regional initiatives such as the Beibu Gulf Rim Economic Circle. 
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Methodology 
 
 
1.12. This is a comprehensive policy-oriented study.  The analysis will be drawn 
from an extensive review of academic literature and existing policies.  Economic and 
statistical data will be used to present the technical information in the report.  It will 
also incorporate views of top government officials in the region as well as people 
from the private sector. 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
1.13. The team had consulted both primary and secondary sources of data in the 
conduct of this study. It had collected Singapore’s trade data such as total 
exports/imports with major trading partners or regions between 1960 and 1982 from 
Economic and Social Statistics of Singapore.  For trade data after 1982, data is 
obtained solely from various issues of Singapore Yearbook of Statistics.  In some 
parts of the report, especially those that require international trade data such as total 
global trade in a particular year, the team consulted various issues of International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Direction of Trade.  It also visited online databases such as 
UN Comtrade and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Trade Statistics Database. 
 
1.14. Acquiring Singapore’s investment data proves to be a challenging task.  As 
Singapore only started focusing on overseas investments after the 1990s, it is quite 
difficult to find investment data covering the period prior to 1990.  Nonetheless, the 
1990s issues of Singapore Investment Aboard, prepared by Singapore Department of 
Statistics, offer some basic data such as total value of overseas investment.  For more 
comprehensive coverage of Singapore’s investment data such as the country or region, 
Singapore Yearbook of Statistics has been consulted. 
 
1.15. There are many secondary literatures covering Singapore’s economic 
development from 1959 through the years leading to the Asian financial crisis in 1997.  
They comprise books, edited volumes and journal articles.  Some of the widely cited 
ones include Competitiveness of the Singapore Economy: A Strategic Perspective 
(1998), The Political Economy of a City-State: Government-made Singapore (1998) 
and Singapore: A Developmental City State (1997).  More are listed in the reference 
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section of this report.  These sources provide a good overview of Singapore’s 
economic development and the rationale behind the regionalisation of Singapore’s 
economy. 
 
1.16. As development of Singapore’s economic strategy after 1997 is still 
relatively new, secondary literature proves to be insufficient for the team to gain a 
good understanding of the topic.  Nonetheless, it was able to find a number of good 
sources such as The Political Economy of a City-State Revisited (2006), Japanese 
Firms in Contemporary Singapore (2008) and Singapore Foreign Policy: The Search 
for Regional Order (2008).  More are listed in the reference page. 
 
1.17. In order to fill the gap, the team consulted primary sources.  Indeed, a good 
sense of where Singapore is heading and the economic policies that the government 
adopted such as signing of FTAs and maintaining the economy’s connection with the 
global economy can be obtained from speeches made by political leaders or reports 
prepared by government institutions such as IE Singapore and ministries such as the 
MTI. 
 
1.18. Trade data of ASEAN is compiled by using international trade statistics, 
while investment data is from sources such as IMF’s Direction of Trade and Asian 
Development Bank Outlook.  As for ASEAN’s investment data, it is obtained from the 
statistics database in the ASEAN Secretariat website and the ASEAN Statistical 
Yearbook. 
 
1.19. To understand the evolution of ASEAN’s development from a political 
entity to one that emphasises economic cooperation, the team consulted books, edited 
volumes and journal articles such as The ASEAN Reader (1993), The 2nd ASEAN 
Reader (2003), ASEAN Co-Operation and Intra-ASEAN Trade (1985), ASEAN: Rises 
to the Challenge (1999), The Economies of Southeast Asia: Before and After the 
Crisis (2002) and ASEAN Economic Development and Co-Operation (1996).  
Together with those listed in the reference page, the team studied various initiatives 
undertaken by ASEAN over the years for greater economic integration.  Primary 
sources such as treaties, agreements and ratifications in ASEAN Document Series also 
prove to be very useful in facilitating detail studies of some of ASEAN’s initiatives 
for greater economic integration such as ASEAN 2020 or the AFTA. 
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PART I: EVOLUTION OF SINGAPORE’S REGIONAL 
ECONOMIC LINKAGES AND INTEGRATION POLICIES 
 
 
1. Changing Profiles of Singapore’s Trade and Investment Pattern with the 
Region 
 
 
(a) Early Economic Development Policy Including Singapore’s Entrepot Position 
in Southeast Asia and Reliance on Malaysia/Indonesia as Hinterland 
 
 
2.1. Under the British colonial government, Singapore served as a free entrepot for 
the region.1  It imported commodities including rubber, tin, timber and spices from 
neighbouring countries (mostly Malaya and Indonesia), and re-exported them to 
markets in Europe and America.  Consumer goods produced in the Western markets 
(especially the United Kingdom (UK)) were re-exported to other countries in the 
region via Singapore.  Trade was mostly financed by commercial and financial houses 
in Singapore owned by British and overseas Chinese.2  A significant part of the trade 
between Singapore and Indonesia was made up of smuggling activities and was not 
reflected in official trade statistics.  In fact, for many years, Singapore did not publish 
its trade statistics with Indonesia. 
 
2.2. The Singapore economy under the British colonial system thrived thanks to its 
regional trading hub status, which allows it to capitalise on its strategic geographic 
position at the heart of Southeast Asia.  It also served as a service hub for the region 
in a number of areas including finance, logistics, shipping, etc.  The British did not 
actively develop the manufacturing industry in part to avoid creating competition for 
its own products from its colonies.  There were nevertheless a number of indigenous 
manufacturing firms set up by the Chinese or Indian migrant business communities.3  
However, these were mostly light industries related to food and beverages and raw 
                                                 
1  T. E. Silcock, “Singapore in Malaya”, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Mar., 1960), pp.36-
37. Kevin Grice and David Drakakis-Smith, “The Role of the State in Shaping Development: Two 
Decades of Growth in Singapore”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 10, No. 3 
(1985), p.348. 
 
2  Girce and Drakakis-Smith, p.350-351. 
 
3  Ibid, p.351. 
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material processing businesses.4  The raw materials were sourced from neighbouring 
countries, mostly in the Malaya Peninsula.5   In fact, most of the plantations or mines 
in British Malaya were owned by families that operated food and beverages and 
rubber processing businesses in Singapore. 
 
2.3. From 1959 to 1965, Singapore went through a series of major political 
changes.  It was granted self-autonomy (except in the areas of defence and foreign 
policy) by the British government in 1959 after the People’s Action Party (PAP) led 
by Mr Lee Kuan Yew won the legislative elections.  In 1963, Singapore decided to 
join the Malayan Peninsula, Sabah and Sarawak to form the Federation of Malaysia, 
which marked complete independence from Britain.  Two years later, in 1965, 
Singapore was expelled from the Federation as differences between the central 
government in Kuala Lumpur and the PAP-led local government became 
irreconcilable. 
 
2.4. Singapore’s production structure and trade pattern began to change after 1959, 
when the PAP government decided to shift the economy away from its heavy 
dependence on the entrepot trade.  It was obvious by then that trading activities alone 
could not provide enough employment for the workforce, nor could it offer a base for 
sustainable economic growth.  The pressure on the economy rose further as 
neighbouring countries, after gaining independence, tried to by-pass Singapore and to 
develop direct trade routes with their trading partners.6   
 
2.5. Following the recommendation of a team of World Bank advisors led by Dr 
Winsemius, the PAP government in 1959 embarked on an industrialisation 
programme that strived to attract multinational corporations (MNCs) to set up their 
manufacturing base in Singapore.  Labour laws and industrial relations laws were 
changed fundamentally to make the city-state’s industrial environment friendly to the 
MNCs.  Key statutory boards such as the Economic Development Board were set up 
                                                 
4  Hiroshi Shimizu, Japanese Firms in Contemporary Singapore (Singapore: NUS Press, c2008), 
p.29. 
 
5  Christine Genzberger, Singapore Business: The Portable Encyclopaedia for Doing Business 
with Singapore (San Rafael, Calif.: World Trade Press, c1994), p.69. 
 
6  Ibid, p.22-27. 
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to spearhead efforts to attract MNCs into Singapore.  The Jurong Township 
Corporation, another statutory board, was formed to build and manage industrial 
estates in Jurong, the western part of the island where the bulk of industrialisation 
took place.7  
 
2.6. Initially, the industrialisation programme was carried out along an import-
substitution line, with Malaya being seen as providing the “domestic market” for the 
industrial products. This strategy was given a much greater emphasis during the two 
years when Singapore was part of the Malaysia Federation.  However, the strategy 
became untenable when Singapore was forced out of the Federation in 1965.8  The 
Singapore government decided then to shift the industrialisation strategy from import-
substitution to export-orientation.  The MNCs played a vital role in this transition.  
Many of them already had a global distribution network and it was not difficult to sell 
what they produced in Singapore in the international markets. Meanwhile, another 
statutory board, the Trade Development Board (later renamed as IE Singapore, in the 
late 1990s) was formed to work with the MNCs and other Singapore-based companies 
to open up new export markets. 
 
TABLE 1     VALUE OF DIRECT INVESTMENT BY COUNTRIES OF 
ORIGIN IN SINGAPORE’S MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1965 TO 1978 
(GROSS FIXED ASSETS AS AT THE END OF EACH YEAR IN US$ MILLION) 
 
1965 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Country Total 
Value 
% of 
total 
Total 
Value 
% of 
total 
Total 
Value
% of 
total
Total 
Value
% of 
total 
Total 
Value 
% of 
total 
Total 
Value
% of 
total
US 23 14.6 343 34.5 1,118 33.1 1,233 33.0 1,366 33.0 1,600 30.5
UK 45 28.7 199 20.0 481 14.2 555 14.8 566 13.7 791 15.1
Holland 40 25.5 183 18.4 473 14.0 525 14.0 571 13.8 904 17.2
Japan 27 17.2 68 6.8 454 13.4 525 14.0 633 15.3 801 15.3
Others 22 14.0 202 20.3 854 25.3 901 24.1 1,009 24.3 1,146 21.9
Total 157 100 995 100 3,380 100 3,739 100 4,145 100 5,242 100 
 Source: Singapore Department of Statistics 
                                                 
7  Linda Low, The Political Economy of a City State: Government-Made Singapore (Singapore: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.36-40. 
 
8  See Albert Lau, A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of 
Disengagement (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998) for more details on Singapore’s separation 
from the Federation of Malaysia. 
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2.7. From 1965 to 1980, foreign direct investment (FDI) into Singapore from the 
United States (US), Western Europe (especially the UK and the Netherlands) and 
Japan rose rapidly (Table 1).  Singapore’s trade pattern also became increasingly 
globalised.  While many of Singapore’s industrial products were naturally sold back 
to countries that provided the FDIs, the MNCs also helped stimulate the growth of 
Singapore’s export substantially.  As seen in Chart 1 and Table 2, Singapore’s trade 
volume rose rapidly during this period. 
 
CHART 1     SINGAPORE'S TRADE WITH MAJOR 
PARTNERS/REGIONS, 1964 to 1980
0
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TABLE 2     SINGAPORE’S TRADE AND TRADE INTENSITY WITH 
MAJOR COUNTRIES/REGIONS, 1965 TO 1980 
 
US European Union (EU 15) Japan China ASEAN 
Year % of 
Total 
Trade 
Trade 
Intensity 
% of 
Total 
Trade 
Trade 
Intensity
% of 
Total 
Trade
Trade 
Intensity
% of 
Total 
Trade
Trade 
Intensity 
% of 
Total 
Trade
Trade 
Intensity
1965 4.4 0.7 16.2 0.1 7.4 0.8 2.9 2.7 - - 
1970 11.4 0.8 15.4 0.2 14.6 1.0 4.1 0.9 25.6 18.9 
1975 15.0 1.3 13.4 0.3 13.8 1.4 2.5 1.2 22.5 16.5 
1980 15.8 1.2 12.6 0.3 14.8 1.4 1.8 0.9 28.2 14.4 
Source: Computed from data in IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics and Economic and Social Statistics of 
Singapore 
 
Notes:  
1. Trade intensity index is defined as: Tij =  [xij / Xit] / [xwj / Xwt] where xij and xwj are the 
values of i's exports and world exports to j, Xit is i's total exports and Xwt is total world 
exports.  As such, the index reflects the ratio of the share of country i's exports going to 
country j, relative to the share of world trade destined for country j.  An index value above one 
indicates that the trade relationship between the two countries is more important than trade 
with the rest of the world. 
2. When the index exceeds “1”, it means Singapore is trading with the country above the 
“normal” level. 
 
 
2.8. By 1980, Singapore’s total trade volume with the US, Japan and Western 
Europe amounted to over 40 % of the city-state’s total global trade.  In contrast, 
Singapore’s economic reliance on other ASEAN members decreased throughout the 
late 1960s and 1970s. This is mostly because Singapore’s economy was entrepot trade 
dependent and specialised in handling primary commodities from Malaysia and 
Indonesia.  Towards the 1980s however, as Singapore’s economy industrialised and 
diversified into manufacturing exports, Singapore’s trade with extra-ASEAN markets 
grew to, in relative terms, dwarf Singapore-ASEAN trade.  
 
(b) Establishment and Evolution of ASEAN: from political initiative to economic 
cooperation through AFTA 
 
2.9. The slowdown of the global economy and the rise of protectionist sentiments 
in industrialised countries against developing economies in the late 1970s and early 
1980s prompted Singapore to step up its economic restructuring and industrial 
upgrading so as to diversify its export markets, which in turn led to the reorientation 
 12
of its economy towards greater regional focus.9   Such a shift in Singapore’s strategy 
coincided with a fundamental shift in ASEAN’s focus during the same period.  From 
1976, ASEAN began to shift its focus from political to economic cooperation, as 
member countries began to recognise that trade liberalisation and economic 
cooperation could provide a major driver for economic growth. 
 
2.10. ASEAN was established in 1967 primarily as a political entity aimed at 
safeguarding regional security and maintaining peace among its member countries.  
There was a fear among the five founding member countries, namely Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, that communism would spread 
from Indo-China to the rest of Southeast Asia.  There were also concerns that 
territorial disputes among neighbouring countries would escalate to become region-
wide conflicts.  Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, for example, saw 
ASEAN’s main achievement in the 1970s as “tearing down the psychological barriers 
or distrust among member nations” and helping to “lubricate relationships which 
could otherwise have generated friction.”10 
 
2.11. Although the ASEAN Declaration listed economic cooperation as one of its 
objectives, it was not in ASEAN’s main agenda in the first 10 years following its 
formation. 11   Narrow nationalism during that period also prevented economic 
integration among member countries as such integration inevitably entails loss of 
economic sovereignty.  The level of trade protection among ASEAN countries 
remained high during this period. 
 
2.12. Changes in the international economic order and the increasing use of 
protectionist trade policies by Western industrialised countries in the late 1970s 
forced ASEAN to re-examine its strategy and to put more emphasis on economic 
                                                 
9  Amitav Acharya, Singapore Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order (Singapore: 
World Scientific, 2008), p.37-52. See also John Wong, "Singapore's Experiences of Industrial 
Restructuring: Lessons for the Other Asian NIEs" in Seiji Naya and Akira Takayama (eds), "Economic 
Development in East and Southeast Asia" (Honolulu, East-West Center, 1990). 
 
10  Speech by the Prime Minister of Singapore at the Official Opening of the Fifth ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting at the Shangri-la Hotel, Thursday, 13 April 1972. 
 
11  Shee, p.755-764. 
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cooperation.  Warming political ties, increased trust and confidence among member 
countries helped facilitate such a transition.12  Broadly speaking, ASEAN’s economic 
integration process can be divided into three phases: early integration attempts (1976-
1991); formalisation of FTAs (1992-1997) and post-Asian financial crisis integration 
(1998 to date). 
 
First Phase: Early Integration Attempts (1976-1991) 
 
2.13. During the first ASEAN Summit in Bali in February 1976, member states 
discussed ways to increase intra-regional trade for the first time.13  The result was the 
signing of the ASEAN Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA) in February 1977.  The 
agreement stipulated a cut of 10 % in tariff rates on bilateral trade among all ASEAN 
countries.14  The group of products affected was to be selected by each member state 
through a product-by-product negotiation.   
 
2.14. The PTA provided an important framework for trade promotion and economic 
integration among ASEAN countries.  However, progress in trade liberalisation was 
very slow in the late 1970s and the 1980s despite two more rounds of tariff reduction 
in 1981 and 1987 respectively.  Although political relationships among ASEAN 
countries had improved considerably by then, economic self-interest remained strong.  
The scope for economic cooperation was also limited by the difference in economic 
development strategies adopted by ASEAN countries and their stage of development 
during this period (e.g. global free trade in Singapore, export promotion in Thailand 
and Malaysia and import substitution in Indonesia and Philippines).  To protect their 
own domestic industries, many member countries took advantage of the product-by-
product approach in the PTA negotiation to exclude “sensitive items” (i.e. items that 
would disadvantage their own domestic industries) from the list of negotiations.  
Many of the items that were given low-tariff treatment were in fact irrelevant for 
                                                 
12  Refer to Table 1 in Appendix for a list of Treaties/Agreements and Ratification for greater 
political collaboration in ASEAN. 
 
13  Shee, p.762. 
 
14  See Article 4 of the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Agreement, 24 February 1977.  
Available at http://www.aseansec.org/1376.htm.  
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ASEAN countries (e.g. snow remover etc).  This product-by-product approach was 
replaced by an across-the-board tariff cut approach, which served to remove room for 
arbitrariness, only in 1987.15   
 
Second Phase: Formalisation of FTAs (1992-1997) 
 
2.15. The pace of economic integration quickened in the 1990s when most ASEAN 
economies began to adopt a more consistent economic development strategy built 
upon FDI-sponsored, export-oriented industrialisation.  Effective economic 
integration was seen as an important part of the efforts to maintain ASEAN’s 
attractiveness as an investment site for MNCs. 16   The grouping reached a new 
economic milestone during the 4th ASEAN Summit in 1992 when it agreed to 
establish an AFTA, the first regional FTA in East Asia.17  The AFTA was formally 
launched in the following year with the Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT) 
as the core trade liberalisation programme.   
 
2.16. The CEPT spelt out an ambitious timeline for the elimination of duties on all 
products in intra-ASEAN trade, except those listed as Sensitive and Highly Sensitive 
Unprocessed Agricultural Products.  For ASEAN-6 (i.e. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), they have to eliminate all tariffs by 2010.  
The deadline for tariff elimination for newer members (i.e. Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV)), on the other hand, has been extended to 2015.  
Member countries also set up other mechanisms to liberalise trade in services and 
investment flow within the region.  One of these examples is the adoption of the 
ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services in 1995.  The agreement aims to 
completely liberalise trade of services among ASEAN members in sectors such as air 
                                                 
15   John Wong, “ASEAN's Experience in Regional Economic Cooperation", Asian Development 
Review (Manila, ADB, Vol.3, No. 1, 1985), p.88 
 
16  Paul Bowles, “ASEAN, AFTA and the ‘New Regionalism’”, Pacific Affairs (Vol.7, No.2, 
Summer 1997), p.223. 
 
17  See Article 2 of the Framework Agreement On Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, 28 
January 1992.  Available at http://www.aseansec.org/1165.htm. 
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transport, business services, construction, financial services, maritime transport, 
telecommunications and tourism.18 
 
2.17. Notwithstanding the increasingly pro-integration stance and rhetoric taken by 
ASEAN countries during the 1990s, the reality remained quite different.  The strong 
official pronouncements and the various agreements that were inked over the years 
were not matched by actual trade and economic integration.  As a result of the 
common MNC-driven, export-oriented growth strategy adopted by almost all ASEAN 
countries, these countries became increasingly globalised in their trading patterns as 
they followed the distribution networks of the MNCs.  They were doing so well in 
export growth that they saw no urgency in promoting intra-regional trade.   
 
Third Phase: Post-Asian Financial Crisis Integration (1998 to date) 
 
2.18. The situation took a more marked turn after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
in which the ASEAN was badly hit.  The grouping’s share in FDI in the developing 
world decreased from an annual average of 22.8 % in 1990-1995 to only 6.5 % in 
2001.  The difficulty ASEAN faced in the late 1990s was further worsened by the 
rising Chinese economy.  Speaking at an AFTA Seminar in 2002, Singapore’s 
Minister for Trade and Industry at that time George Yeo highlighted that the rapid 
economic development of China, which coincided with the Asian financial crisis, had 
created problems for the recovery of ASEAN economies.  As China was less affected 
by the crisis, it was able to attract investment away from ASEAN.  As Mr Yeo noted, 
“In 1990, China accounted for less than 20 % of total foreign investment in 
developing Asia while Southeast Asia took 60 %.  Today, the numbers are 
reversed.” 19   Mr Yeo noted that ASEAN’s recovery was further hampered by 
challenges from other emerging markets in India, Latin America and Eastern Europe 
as well as regional blocs such as the European Union (EU) and the North American 
Free Trade Area (NAFTA).   
 
                                                 
18  Chang Chiou Yi, “ASEAN-China Economic Relations: Moving Towards Services”.  In Saw 
Swee-Hock, ASEAN-China Economic Relations (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), p.151. 
 
19  Speech by BG (NS) George Yeo, Minister for Trade and Industry of Singapore at the AFTA 
Seminar, Grand Hyatt Hotel, 31 January 2002. 
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2.19. In the face of the crisis, the grouping decided to speed up economic integration.  
Generally, the integration process took place at three levels.  First, to strengthen 
ASEAN’s competitive position, the grouping agreed to ratify the “ASEAN Vision 
2020” plan in 1998.  The plan called for the creation of an ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) which allows free flow of goods, services and investments within 
the community.  The vision was built on previous agreements including the 
aforementioned AFTA (1992) and the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services 
(1995).  To support the implementation of the “ASEAN Vision 2020”, new 
agreements were signed in subsequent years, including the setting up of an ASEAN 
Investment Area (1998) to encourage freer flow of investment in the region, as well as 
the Hanoi Action Plan (1998) and the Vientiane Action Plan (2004), both of which 
provide roadmaps to how ASEAN should progress towards the creation of an 
economic community.  
 
2.20. Recognising that the development gap between the more developed and the 
less developed ASEAN member countries (mainly CLMV) needed to be substantially 
narrowed to achieve effective regional economic integration, ASEAN introduced the 
Initiatives for ASEAN Integration (IAI) in 2001.  The initiatives provide a platform 
for more developed ASEAN members to invest in the GMS countries either through 
various sub-regional development projects or on a bilateral basis.  As of March 2008, 
there were 203 development projects in the IAI Work Plan, out of which 116 projects 
were completed in areas ranging from infrastructure development to human resource 
training (details are at Table 3). 
 
TABLE 3     STATUS OF IAI DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS  
(AS OF END 2008) 
 
STATUS NO. OF PROJECTS
% OF 
TOTAL 
PROJECTS 
Projects that have secured full 
funding 158 
116 o Completed 
o Under implementation 42 
77.8 
Projects that have secured partial 
funding  
(Donors have selected certain 
components of the project; other donors 
6 2.9 
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will have to be found to fund the 
remaining components) 
Matching Process Underway 15 7.4 
No Funding Support Yet 24 11.9 
Total 203 100 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat 
 
 
2.21. The second plank of ASEAN’s response to the Asia crisis was its decision to 
strengthen the grouping’s economic links with other economies.  The decision came 
about as it became clear that the costs of an inward-looking economic strategy far 
outweighed the benefits it conferred on member economies.  At the 1999 ASEAN 
Summit, for example, Singapore’s former Prime Minister Goh urged ASEAN member 
countries to broaden and deepen its economic integration internally while at the same 
time, strengthen their links with major economies externally. 20   
 
2.22. To this end, ASEAN set up an “ASEAN-plus” framework which brought 
regional powerhouses such as China, South Korea and Japan into ASEAN as official 
dialogue partners.  This opened ASEAN up to more market and investment 
opportunities.  Indeed, economic initiatives such as the agreement to formalise the 
CAFTA and the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Partnership Agreement proved to be 
effective in promoting growth in ASEAN’s regional trade and intra-ASEAN trade.  
These efforts led to the emergence of another major, though informal, economic 
grouping: the “ASEAN+3” grouping which consists of the 10 ASEAN countries, as 
well as China, Japan and South Korea.  Although “ASEAN+3” has economic 
importance and muscles that are far greater than what ASEAN can project at the 
global stage, ASEAN is still widely recognised as being the core that pulls all the 13 
economies together. 
 
2.23. As part of its efforts to go beyond member countries, ASEAN also tried to 
strengthen economic linkages on a global basis through the setting up of the East 
Asian Summit and the establishment of cooperation linkages with the EU and the US 
                                                 
20  “ASEAN - Meeting the Challenges Ahead”. Keynote address by Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong At The Opening Of The 32nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 23 July 1999. 
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including Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) and Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM). 
 
2.24. The third aspect of the ASEAN response to the Asian financial crisis was a 
concerted attempt by member countries to build the region’s capability to handle 
future financial crisis through region-wide financial cooperation schemes.  In this 
regard, they work very closely with the other three economies within the “ASEAN+3” 
framework.  The Chiangmai Initiatives (CMI), which provide for a series of swap 
arrangements to boost each member country’s ability to defend its currency during a 
crisis, as well as the various surveillance mechanisms and attempts at policy 
consultation and coordination among the 13 economies, are some of the visible results 
of ASEAN’s post-crisis integration approach.  As a result of the various integration 
efforts, intra-ASEAN trade increased considerably from about US$58 billion in 1991 
to reach nearly US$300 billion by the end of 2006 (Chart 3).    
 
CHART 3     INTRA-ASEAN TRADE, 1991 TO 2006
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Impact of ASEAN’s Integration on Singapore’s Trade Pattern in ASEAN 
 
2.25. The three phases of ASEAN’s economic integration as detailed earlier had 
some positive effect on Singapore’s trade pattern in the region.  However, significant 
growth was not witnessed in the first phase (1976-1991).  From 1977 to 1985, 
Singapore’s trade with ASEAN increased only from US$5.8 billion to about US$9.5 
U
S$
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billion.  The sluggish growth continued even after ASEAN raised the preferential 
level of the PTA from 10 % when it was implemented in 1977 to 50 % in 1988.  
Visible growth to Singapore’s trade with ASEAN was seen in the second phase 
(1992-1997) when ASEAN adopted the AFTA and the CEPT scheme in 1993.  
During this period, Singapore-ASEAN trade increased from US$22 billion in 1990 to 
nearly US$70 billion by the end of 1996 (Chart 4).  
 
CHART 4     GROWTH OF SINGAPORE'S TRADE WITH ASEAN IN 
RELATION TO KEY ASEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
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2.26. The growth of Singapore-ASEAN trade in the 1990s made ASEAN a major 
market for Singapore’s trade (Chart 5).  The share of Singapore-ASEAN trade in 
Singapore’s total global trade increased from about 20 % in 1985 to nearly 30 % in 
1996 (Chart 6).  However, this increase did not signify that Singapore’s trade was 
more oriented towards the ASEAN region in the 1990s.  As Table 4 shows, the trade 
intensity of Singapore’s trade with ASEAN declined from 1990 to 1996 even though 
the share of Singapore-ASEAN trade in Singapore’s total global trade increased 
during the same period. 
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CHART 5     SINGAPORE'S TRADE WITH MAJOR 
PARTNERS/REGIONS, 1980 to 1996
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CHART 6     SHARE OF SINGAPORE'S TRADE WITH MAJOR 
TRADING PARTNERS/REGIONS IN SINGAPORE'S TOTAL 
GLOBAL TRADE, 1980 TO 1996 
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TABLE 4      SINGAPORE’S TRADE AND TRADE INTENSITY WITH 
MAJOR COUNTRIES/REGIONS, 1980 TO 1996 
 
US European Union(EU 15) Japan China ASEAN 
Year % of 
Total 
Trade 
Trade 
Intensity 
% of 
Total 
Trade 
Trade 
Intensity
% of 
Total 
Trade
Trade 
Intensity
% of 
Total 
Trade
Trade 
Intensity 
% of 
Total 
Trade 
Trade 
Intensity
1980 15.8 1.2 12.6 0.3 14.8 1.4 1.8 0.9 28.2 14.4 
1985 17.9 1.2 11.6 0.3 13.4 1.5 5.3 0.6 19.3 14.4 
1990 18.5 1.4 17.7 0.3 14.9 1.4 2.6 1.0 19.3 10.5 
1996 17.4 1.2 13.7 0.4 13.3 1.4 3.0 0.9 27.2 7.6 
Source:  Computed from data in IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics and Economic and Social Statistics of 
Singapore 
 
Notes:  
1. Trade intensity index is defined as Tij =  [xij / Xit] / [xwj / Xwt] where xij and xwj are the values 
of i's exports and world exports to j, Xit is i's total exports and Xwt is total world exports.  As such, 
the index reflects the ratio of the share of country i's exports going to country j, relative to the 
share of world trade destined for country j.  An index value above one indicates that the trade 
relationship between the two countries is more important than trade with the rest of the world. 
2. When the index exceeds “1”, it means Singapore is trading with the country above the “normal” 
level. 
 
2.27. Significant growth of Singapore’s trade with ASEAN only occurred during the 
third phase (1998 to date).  This was demonstrated in the 170 % increase of 
Singapore-ASEAN trade from US$67 billion in 1997 to US$182 billion by the end of 
2007 (Chart 7).  In terms of percentage share, Singapore-ASEAN trade was the 
largest in Singapore’s total global trade in 2007, accounting for nearly 33 % of 
Singapore’s total global trade (Chart 8).  The trade intensity of Singapore-ASEAN 
trade also began to rise during this period (Table 5). 
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CHART 7     SINGAPORE'S TRADE WITH MAJOR TRADING 
PARTNERS/REGIONS, 1997 to 2007
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CHART 8     SHARE OF SINGAPORE'S TRADE WITH MAJOR 
PARTNERS/REGIONS IN SINGAPORE'S TOTAL GLOBAL 
TRADE, 1997 TO 2007
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TABLE 5     SINGAPORE’S TRADE AND TRADE INTENSITY WITH 
MAJOR COUNTRIES/REGIONS, 1995 TO 2007 
 
US European Union(EU 15) Japan China ASEAN 
Year % of 
Total 
Trade 
Trade 
Intensity 
% of 
Total 
Trade 
Trade 
Intensity
% of 
Total 
Trade
Trade 
Intensity
% of 
Total 
Trade
Trade 
Intensity 
% of 
Total 
Trade
Trade 
Intensity
1995 16.6 1.2 13.4 0.4 14.7 1.4 2.8 0.8 27.5 7.8 
2000 16.2 0.9 12.3 0.5 12.3 1.4 4.6 1.2 29.6 8.1 
2005 11.0 0.7 11.4 0.3 7.4 1.2 9.4 1.5 32.7 8.4 
2007 10.4 0.7 9.6 0.3 6.4 1.3 10.8 1.7 32.6 8.6 
Source: Computed from data in IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics and Economic and Social Statistics of 
Singapore 
 
Notes:  
1. Trade intensity index is defined as Tij =  [xij / Xit] / [xwj / Xwt] where xij and xwj are the values of i's 
exports and world exports to j, Xit is i's total exports and Xwt is total world exports.  As such, the 
index reflects the ratio of the share of country i's exports going to country j, relative to the share of 
world trade destined for country j.  An index value above one indicates that the trade relationship 
between the two countries is more important than trade with the rest of the world. 
 
2. When the index exceeds “1”, it means Singapore is trading with the country above the “normal” level. 
 
Impact of ASEAN Integration on Singapore’s Investment Pattern in ASEAN 
 
2.28. Besides trade, Singapore’s overseas investment became more regionalised.  
The Asian financial crisis notwithstanding, Singapore’s direct investment abroad had 
grown considerably since the 1990s.  As Chart 9 shows, the growth of the total value 
of Singapore’s investment abroad surged in the 1990s, reaching some US$173 billion 
by the end of 2007. 
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CHART 9     SINGAPORE'S TOTAL DIRECT INVESTMENT 
ABROAD,  1980-2007
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2.29. A large amount of Singapore’s investment had been allocated to the closer 
ASEAN and East Asian region.  As shown in Charts 10A, 10B and 10C, ASEAN was 
the destination of nearly a quarter of Singapore’s direct investment abroad in 1996, 
2000 and 2007.  Despite the increase in the absolute amount of Singapore’s 
investment in ASEAN and the East Asian Region is increasing, the relevant 
percentage was decreasing. 
 
U
S$
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CHART 10A     SINGAPORE'S DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD 
BY COUNTRY/REGION, 1996
Brunei, 0.2%
Vietnam, 1.3%
Philippines, 1.8%
Thailand, 2.9%
Indonesia, 7.0%
Malaysia, 17.3%
China, 11.5%Hong Kong, 10.8%
EU, 15.1%
USA, 4.7%
Others, 27.4%
ASEAN,
30.5%
Source: Yearbook Statistics of Singapore
Singapore's Total Direct Investment Abroad for 1996 = SGD55.5 billion
 
 
CHART 10B     SINGAPORE'S DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD 
BY COUNTRY/REGION, 2000 (%)
Other ASEAN Countries
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USA, 6.3%
Others, 37.8%
ASEAN,
23.9%
Singapore's Total Direct Investment Abroad for 2000 = SGD 98.3 billion
Source: Yearbook Statistics of Singapore
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CHART 10C     SINGAPORE'S DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD 
BY COUNTRY/REGION, 2007
Other ASEAN Countries,
0.8%
Vietnam, 0.7%
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Thailand, 5.4%
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EU, 9.9%
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Others, 41.7%
ASEAN,
22.2%
Singapore's Total Direct Investment Abroad for 2000 = SGD 259.7 billion
Source: Yearbook Statistics of Singapore
 
 
2.30. Singapore companies are also showing greater interest in investing in 
development projects in the GMS countries such as Vietnam.  The city-state is a 
major participant in the IAI programme.  Since the programme’s inception in 2001, 
Singapore has been involved in 33 projects through the ASEAN framework and 56 
projects on a bilateral basis (Table 6).  Most of these projects involved improving the 
transport and energy infrastructure as well as in human resource development in the 
GMS countries. 
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TABLE 6      SINGAPORE’S AND ASEAN-5’S CONTRIBUTION TO IAI 
PROJECTS (AS AT THE END OF 2008) 
 
Through ASEAN Framework Bilateral Basis 
Country No. of 
Projects 
Funding 
(US$ Million) 
% of Total 
Funding 
No. of 
Projects
Funding 
(US$ Million ) 
% of Total 
Funding 
Brunei 8 1.5 4.8 4 0.4 0.3 
Indonesia 9 0.8 2.6 29 1.7 1.1 
Malaysia 58 4.8 15.6 62 5.9 3.6 
Philippines 9 0.6 1.8 31 0.3 0.2 
Singapore 33 22.8 73.6 56 53.1 32.8 
Thailand 13 0.5 1.6 97 100.4 62 
TOTAL 130 31 100 221 161.8 100 
 Source: ASEAN Secretariat 
 
Importance of ASEAN’s Integration to Singapore 
 
2.31. Singapore has long been playing a leading role in pushing for trade 
liberalisation within ASEAN.  After the first ASEAN Summit in Bali in February 
1976, Singapore took the lead in liberalising its intra-ASEAN trade ahead of the 
signing of the PTA by introducing a 10 % across-the-board tariff reduction on its 
bilateral trade with the Philippines and Thailand in January 1977.21  When Thailand 
called for an adjustment on the preference level set by the PTA in 1987, Singapore set 
the pace by being the first among ASEAN members to increase the agreement’s 
preference level to 50 %, and implement an across-the-board tariff cuts on all trade 
items entering Singapore.22  Singapore is also the first ASEAN nation to comply with 
AFTA’s timeline by completely removing tariffs for all goods in its ASEAN bilateral 
trade and imposing almost no restrictions on the flow of ASEAN investment into 
Singapore. 
 
2.32. There are a number of reasons why Singapore has been very pro-active in 
promoting economic integration within ASEAN.  Firstly, it is to help ensure 
Singapore’s survival and security.  As one of the smallest countries in the region in 
                                                 
21  Shee, p.762. 
 
22  Arvind Panagariya, Regionalism in Trade Policies (World Scientific: Singapore, 1999) p.127-
128. 
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terms of population and geographical size, and without any meaningful production 
hinterland or domestic market, Singapore is both economically and politically more 
vulnerable than many other ASEAN countries.  Being a predominantly Chinese state 
surrounded by non-Chinese neighbours that have not been friendly to Chinese 
historically, Singapore’s position is particularly precarious.23  It therefore sees closer 
economic linkage with ASEAN countries as an effective way to fostering good 
political relationship with its neighbours, and that an economically prosperous 
ASEAN would help ensure political stability in the region.  Efforts to establish some 
sub-regional economic groupings such as the Singapore-Johore-Riau (SIJORI) 
Growth Triangle were partly aimed at fostering political cooperation with Singapore’s 
neighbouring states.   
 
2.33. Secondly, Singapore hopes to leverage on ASEAN to build an external wing 
for its economy.  Without any significant natural resources, hinterland and domestic 
market to speak of, Singapore’s ability to attract MNCs and to grow its own 
corporations depends, to a large extent, on its ability to capitalise on and synergise 
with the various comparative advantages that its neighbouring countries offer.  In fact, 
Singapore has always been viewed by some as the de facto capital city of ASEAN.  
Indeed, one important component of Singapore’s economic strategy has always been 
to serve as a “business headquarter” for MNCs to maintain production operations in 
the region, a role Singapore performed during the 1950s and 1960s when the city-state 
was the region’s entrepot city.  In recent years, Singapore continues to play the same 
role, relying on its position as an efficient service provider in the region.  Greater 
economic integration within ASEAN not only increases market opportunities but also 
eases investment flows in the region. 24 
 
2.34. The need to leverage on ASEAN as an economic hinterland to attract foreign 
investments became even clearer with the emergence of new economic rivals like 
China, and the formation of free trade groups in other parts of the world like NAFTA.  
Individually, Singapore could not offer a sufficiently attractive base for MNCs.  As 
part of a larger ASEAN economy with a combined population of about 500 million, 
                                                 
23  Racial relationships have long been a source of tensions in Malaysia and Indonesia.  There 
were various “anti-Chinese” riots in both countries in the past. 
 
24  Acharya, p.52. 
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however, Singapore’s position as a base for MNCs is significantly strengthened.  As 
Singapore’s former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong noted in 1992, “unless ASEAN 
can (use AFTA to) match the other regions in attractiveness both as a base for 
investments and as a market for their products, investments by multinational 
companies are likely to flow away from our part of the world to the Single European 
Market and NAFTA”.  
 
2.35. Today, Singapore continues to play a leading role in promoting the integration 
of ASEAN economies.  Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated in 2007 
that “by presenting ourselves coherently, (ASEAN) will show (itself) to be capable of 
pursuing (its) interests and engaging the world”.25  Singapore also envisioned that 
greater integration in ASEAN can cement cooperation in various ASEAN-initiated 
fora, such as the East Asian Summit and Asia Regional Forum.  In order to facilitate 
closer integration within ASEAN, Singapore is one of the first members to ratify the 
ASEAN Charter and the blueprint for the AEC.  In 2007, when Singapore hosted the 
13th ASEAN Summit, it chose “One ASEAN at the Heart of Dynamic Asia” as the 
theme to show its commitment to regional integration. 
 
(c) Singapore’s expanded regional economic linkages beyond ASEAN 
 
2.36. It is important to note that Singapore’s active role in ASEAN represents only a 
part of its two-pronged approach in its external economic policy.  While emphasising 
the importance of ASEAN integration, it continues to maintain close trade relations 
with other economies.  This is manifested in a number of ways.   
 
2.37. First, Singapore actively pursues bilateral FTAs with countries outside 
ASEAN despite it being a member of AFTA.  Compared to other ASEAN economies, 
Singapore has been the most active in concluding FTAs.  Table 7 shows the FTAs and 
economic partnership agreement concluded by Singapore.  Since 2000, Singapore has 
concluded nearly a dozen FTAs with major economies including Australia, China, 
Japan, Korea and the US, as well as smaller economies such as Jordan, Panama and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). 
                                                 
25  Speech By Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, at the ASEAN Day Lecture, 7 August 2007. 
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TABLE 7     SINGAPORE’S FTA AND ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT PARTNERS 
 
PARTNERS / REGION FTA SIGNED IN 
New Zealand August 2000 
Japan January 2002 
European Free Trade Area  
(comprising Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) June 2002 
Australia February 2003 
US May 2003 
Jordan April 2004 
South Korea August 2004 
Trans-Pacific Area  
(comprising Brunei, Chile and New Zealand) June 2005 
India June 2005 
Panama March 2006 
Peru May 2008 
China October 2008 
GCC countries (i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) December 2008 
Source: IE Singapore 
 
Notes: 
1. Singapore’s FTAs with Japan, New Zealand, Trans-Pacific Area and India are referred to as 
Economic Partnership Agreement, Closer Economic Partnership, Strategic Economic Partnership 
Agreement and Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement respectively. 
2. The table excludes Singapore’s FTAs signed under the ASEAN framework, i.e. AFTA, CAFTA, 
Japan-ASEAN FTA and South Korea-ASEAN FTA. 
 
 
2.38. Second, on top of being an ASEAN member, Singapore is also an active 
member in other regional and multilateral groupings.  Currently, Singapore is a 
member of the APEC and the WTO.  Singapore also initiated many platforms with 
other regions such as the ASEM, Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation and 
the Asia-Middle East Dialogue to establish dialogue and strengthen cooperation 
between Singapore, Asia and the respective regions. 
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2.39. Third, Singapore is deepening its bilateral relations with emerging economies, 
particularly China and India.  Since Singapore established official diplomatic relations 
with China in 1990, there has been a marked change in the pattern of trade and 
investment between the two countries.  For instance, Singapore’s trade volume with 
China increased quite significantly from about US$2.9 billion in 1990 to US$7.8 
billion by the end of 1996.  From 1997 to the end of 2007, Singapore’s trade with 
China grew over 500 %, from US$9.8 billion to US$60.5 billion (Chart 11).  
Singapore’s direct investment in China also registered a considerable growth as the 
city-state’s relations with Beijing deepen.  It ballooned from just US$220 million in 
1991 to over US$37.5 billion by the end of 2007. 
 
CHART 11     SINGAPORE'S BILATERAL TRADE WITH 
CHINA, 1990 TO 2007
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2.40. Singapore’s trade and investment relationship with India has also deepened in 
recent years.  Unlike those with China, Singapore-India relations only started to 
develop in recent years, particularly after the two countries began negotiations to 
establish a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement in 2003.  As shown in 
Chart 12, Singapore’s total trade volume with India has registered a significant 
growth of nearly 300%, from US$4.5 billion in 2003 to US$16.7 billion in 2007.  At 
the same time, Singapore’s total direct investment in India also rose from about 
US$600 million in 2003 to over US$3 billion in 2007. 
U
S$
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CHART 12     SINGAPORE'S TOTAL BILATERAL TRADE WITH 
INDIA, 1990 TO 2007
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2.  Major policy initiatives to promote Singapore’s integration with the 
region 
 
(a) Political dimension of Singapore’s regionalisation moves 
 
2.41. Singapore’s external economic policy is an important part of its overall 
economic strategy to achieve sustainable growth and development for the city-state.  
The effectiveness and relevance of Singapore’s external economic policy, including 
its regional economic integration policy, has to be assessed in terms of its usefulness 
in helping the government to accomplish its overall economic objectives.   
 
2.42. The Singapore government plays a critical part in transforming the city-state’s 
economic landscape over the years.  It believes strongly in adopting a proactive 
approach to help shape the structure of the economy.  In addition to exerting a strong 
direct influence on the economy through its policies, it also indirectly steers the 
direction of the city-state’s economic development through the various GLCs set up 
over the years.  While the GLCs are largely run like private sector companies with 
similar commercial objectives, they are also deployed from time to time to help 
achieve some national economic objectives.  These objectives include, amongst others, 
building an external economic wing for the city-state through strategic investments 
and trade in foreign countries. 
 
2.43. Broadly speaking, the Singapore economy has gone through four phases of 
development.  In the 1960s and the 1970s, the government’s objective was to develop 
labour-intensive industries such as textile and food and beverage industries, to provide 
jobs for the large pool of unemployed people in the city-state.  In the 1980s, as 
competitive pressure from other low-cost, low-wage developing countries in the 
region became more intense, the policy emphasis shifted to the development of 
capital-intensive industries and the upgrading of technical skills of the workforce.  
Electronics, ship-building and petrochemical industries became the mainstay of the 
economy.  By the 1990s, the policy focus moved to technology-intensive industries, 
as the government channelled its resources towards attracting and developing high-
tech companies such as those in the wafer fabrication industry and other high-end 
electronic products.  Efforts had also been made during this period to boost the 
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service sector, in particular the financial sector and tourism industry, through 
improved efficiency.  
 
2.44. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the government has been trying to 
build up Singapore’s comparative advantage in knowledge-based, innovation and 
creativity-driven industries by strongly encouraging research and development (R&D) 
and innovation.  Life science, creative industry, wealth management service, 
education service and entertainment industry are some of the new areas where policy 
makers believe that Singapore should develop on the basis of its new comparative 
advantage.26 
 
2.45. As the policy initiatives and with it the structure of the economy changed over 
time, two constants nevertheless remained:  the commitment to a free trade policy and 
the reliance on MNCs as a key driver of growth.  Whether it is labour-intensive, 
capital-intensive, technology-intensive or innovation-driven industries that the 
Singapore government is trying to promote, they have to be export-oriented because 
Singapore lacks a sizeable domestic market to sustain the industries on its own.  
Export-orientation and global competition are also widely accepted as the only way to 
ensure that companies in Singapore maintain their competitive edge in the global 
market.  This basic philosophy compels the government to commit to a free trade 
policy with as many countries as possible. 
 
2.46. The MNCs have long been playing a major role in the development of 
Singapore’s economy.  They have been a source of not only investment capital, but 
more importantly, technologies, management skills and also distribution networks in 
the global markets.  As the structure of the Singapore economy changes, the types of 
MNC that it tries to attract change as well.  Nevertheless, the basic policy approach 
remains the same:  policy makers make strategic choices about the kind of industry 
Singapore should promote, and then use a wide range of instruments and policy 
incentives to attract the relevant MNCs into Singapore.  In the meantime, local 
companies are strongly encouraged to learn from the MNCs and to develop the local 
                                                 
26  See Tan, KS and SY Phang, 2005, “Economic Growth and Strategic Investment in 
Infrastructure: Perspective from Singapore”, in The Economic Prospects of Singapore, edited by W. 
Koh and R Mariano, Pearson, Addison Wesley, 2005. 
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production capability.  Typically, many local companies started out as sub-contractors 
to the MNCs.  Over time, they grew to become more “full-fledged” companies.  Some 
of them eventually grew to be strong competitors of the MNCs. 
 
2.47. Over the years, the government has set up a great number of GLCs to ensure 
that there is indeed a sufficient amount of local companies to build up the production 
capability in Singapore.  These GLCs remain majority-owned (or significantly owned) 
by the government even after they have gone public.  They are given the mandate to 
run their businesses like commercially driven private sector companies.  
 
2.48. In the early years, where Singapore’s economic policy emphasis was on 
labour-intensive and capital-intensive industries, the incentives provided by the 
Singapore government were generally of a fiscal and financial nature, e.g. the 
extension of tax holidays, subsidies on infrastructure development, training of skilled 
workforce, etc.  As the city-state’s industrial structure became more sophisticated, the 
incentive structure changed as well.  While moving towards technology-based and 
innovation-driven industries, the Singapore government is increasingly engaged in 
“strategic” competition with what it sees as rival countries, with the intent of securing 
a “first mover advantage”.  The incentive package offered to MNCs becomes more 
specific to the needs of the industries and firms.  
 
2.49. The pharmaceutical sector is a good example that illustrates the Singapore 
government’s pro-activeness in promoting the development of an industry.  To attract 
investment in this sector, the government offers such incentives as low corporation 
tax and easy entry for foreign employees with open immigration policies.  On the 
research front, it has embarked on a programme to encourage working relationships 
between state-funded institutes and local universities, as well as a US$500 million 
project to build the “Biopolis”, a purpose-built biomedical research hub which will 
accommodate researchers from both the public and private sectors.  The MTI also set 
up the Agency of Science, Technology and Research as a lead agency for scientific 
R&D in Singapore. 
 
2.50. The export-oriented nature of the economy and the heavy reliance on the 
MNCs necessitates a liberal external economic policy in Singapore, not just with 
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regard to trade in goods and services but also capital and importation of labour.  By 
the early 1970s, the unemployment problem that used to plague Singapore had been 
replaced by one of labour-shortage.  To satisfy the production needs of the MNCs and 
local companies, the government started aggressively to source for low-wage, low-
skilled foreign workers from the region, especially from Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Thailand.  Many of the labour laws with regard to foreign workers were relaxed to 
facilitate their inflow into Singapore.  It should also be noted that MNCs have a strong 
influence on the formulation of Singapore’s external economic policy.  On many 
occasions, government policies have to take into consideration the needs of MNCs to 
reach out to certain markets.  
 
2.51. Starting from the early 1990s, Singapore has also embarked on an aggressive 
effort to develop an external economic wing.  Drawing from the examples of small 
European countries like the Netherlands and Norway which derive a large part of their 
Gross National Product (GNP) from their investment income from abroad, the 
Singapore government actively encouraged local companies to invest overseas, 
especially in East Asian and ASEAN economies, so as to allow these companies to 
leverage on and synergise their own comparative advantage with that of the city-
state’s neighbouring countries.  Singapore companies were seen to be able to provide 
capital, technology and management expertise to the countries of their investment 
while leveraging on the low cost of these countries’ land and labour.  Leading the 
charge were the large GLCs which began to invest actively in a large number of 
ASEAN countries.  Sizeable GLCs such as Sembawang Corp, Keppel Corp and 
Singapore Technology, for example, have built a number of industrial parks in 
countries like Indonesia and Vietnam.  
 
2.52. It was in this same period that Singapore companies began to make substantial 
investment in China as well, as part of its external wing building policy but more 
importantly, to integrate its economy with that of China so as to benefit from China’s 
strong potential for growth.  Some private companies in Singapore, such as the United 
Overseas Bank (UOB), started operating in China, especially in coastal provinces 
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such as Guangdong and Fujian, as early as the 1980s.27  After the normalisation of 
China-Singapore relations in October 1990, GLCs began to move into China in 
droves.  From 1990 to June 1994, Singapore invested in over 3,900 projects in China, 
amounting to a total contract volume of US$6.8 billion.  By the end of 1997, 
Singapore’s actual investment in China reached US$8.8 billion.28  
 
2.53. Singapore companies, led by the GLCs, were involved in a number of large 
infrastructure projects in China, such as the Wuxi Industrial Park and the Dalian 
Container Terminal.  However, the most high profile project was the Suzhou 
Industrial Park (SIP), one of Singapore’s most ambitious investment projects in China. 
Launched in 1994, the SIP was a joint development project between the Singapore 
government and the Suzhou municipal government.  It aimed to build an industrial 
park with public housing and recreational facilities similar to those built in Singapore.  
SIP was also to be managed using Singapore’s “software” and systems.  The social 
security system offered to the workers within the SIP, for example, was based on 
Singapore’s Central Provident Fund scheme.   
 
2.54. Individual development projects within the SIP were joint ventures by 
Singapore and Chinese companies.  From Singapore’s side, the efforts were led 
largely by GLCs, not the private sector.  For instance, the first phase of SIP’s 
development was a joint venture undertaken by the Singapore-Suzhou Township 
Development, which is a Singapore consortium of twenty-four companies led by the 
Keppel group (also see page 41 on Keppel Corp) and the Suzhou Industrial Park 
Corporation, its Chinese counterpart.  
 
2.55. Besides China, Singapore also started to actively engage India, both in trade 
and in investment, from the late 1990s.  In recent years, much effort was spent on 
fostering Singapore’s economic links with the Middle East.  Again, in both cases, the 
GLCs led the way with some private sector companies following suit a few years later. 
                                                 
27  See John Wong, “Southeast Asia Ethnic Chinese Investment in China”, EAI Working Paper 
No.15 (Singapore: East Asia Institute, National University of Singapore, 1998), p.16. 
 
28  See John Wong, “Sino-Singapore Relations: Looking Back and Looking Forward,” in 
Singapore China: 1990-2000, Commemorative Souvenir in Celebration of the 10th Anniversary of the 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the Republic of Singapore and The People’s Republic 
of China, (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2000).  
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2.56. The Singapore government also took steps to re-define Singapore’s economic 
strategy to help retain the city-state’s international competitiveness and attractiveness 
to foreign MNCs.  As a result of the sharp realignment of regional currency and the 
appreciation of the Singapore dollar, as well as the emergence of China, Singapore’s 
competitiveness was greatly eroded.  To help the city-state regain its competitive edge, 
the government introduced the “Industry 21” initiative in 1999 as the blueprint to 
restructure Singapore’s industrial sector.  The goal under this initiative is for 
Singapore to be a leading centre of knowledge-driven activities and to consolidate its 
position as a regional headquarter (RHQ) for MNCs by 2010.  While retaining the 
electronics, petrochemical, engineering and logistics industries as sources of growth, 
the initiative identified healthcare, biomedical sciences, education, and 
communication and media as new economic pillars.29 
 
2.57. After the Asian financial crisis, Singapore’s external wing is still largely 
confined to East Asia, due to the region’s geographical proximity to the city-state and 
Singapore’s overall development strategy to establish itself as a RHQ.  An 
increasingly protectionist global economic environment brought about by the 
formation of regional blocs in different parts of the world also made it more pragmatic 
for Singapore to focus on the region.   
 
(b) Strategies to expand regional linkages 
 
2.58. Two broad policy approaches characterise Singapore’s strategies to expand its 
external economic linkages: 
 
1) a two-pronged approach to free trade;  and  
 
2) a comprehensive coverage of its free trade policy.   
 
2.59. These policy approaches are driven by two key considerations:  to address the 
constraints Singapore faces as a small city state with no hinterland or a sizeable 
                                                 
29  Augustine Tan, “Official Efforts to Attract FDI: The Case of Singapore's Economic 
Development Board (EDB),” Lee-Jay Cho, Yoon Hyung Kim, and Chung H. Kee. (eds.), Industrial 
Globalization in the Twenty-first Century: Impact and Consequences for East Asia and Korea (Seoul, 
Korea: Korea Development Institute; Honolulu, Hawaii: Distributed by University of Hawaii Press, 
c2002), p.109-133. 
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domestic market, and to ensure that the external linkages are aligned with its domestic 
policy agenda at different stages of its development. 
 
2.60. As a small city-state economy, it is in Singapore’s interest to develop trade 
and investment links with as many economies as possible.  Politically, Singapore has 
to be sensitive to the views of other ASEAN countries.  Economically, however, it 
cannot count on ASEAN as its only or even main export market.  The slow progress 
ASEAN made on regional economic integration from the 1970s to the late 1990s 
further reinforced Singapore’s view that, while it would benefit a great deal from an 
economically integrated ASEAN, it would have to continue to diversify its export 
markets outside the grouping until ASEAN’s economic integration had progressed to 
a certain stage.  This explains Singapore’s two-pronged approach in its external 
economic integration policy:  to pursue greater economic integration within ASEAN 
and help develop ASEAN’s economic ties with other regions, while at the same time 
strengthen its own economic linkages with countries outside the grouping.  The latter 
efforts took the form of a series of bilateral FTAs with countries both within and 
outside East Asia.  These bilateral FTAs are mostly concluded after the Asian 
financial crisis. 
 
2.61. On the issue of policy alignment, the focus of Singapore’s external economic 
policy has shifted in accordance with the different stages of the city-state’s economic 
development as detailed earlier in this Part.  Singapore moved quickly from 
advocating free trade in goods into advocating free trade in services as well as freer 
movement of capital and labour.  Given the differences between the structure of 
Singapore’s economy and those of other ASEAN countries, and the developmental 
gap between them, Singapore’s interest and policy focus have always been very 
different from and much more comprehensive than its neighbouring countries. 
 
2.62. Unlike most ASEAN economies which have a large agricultural sector and a 
mostly labour-intensive manufacturing sector, Singapore, with its origin as an 
entrepot and a trade hub, has a large tradable services sector.  The Singapore 
government is fully aware of the need for the city-state’s economy to stay ahead of 
other ASEAN economies in order to preserve its export competitiveness.  Thus, as the 
other ASEAN economies began to develop their labour-intensive industries such as 
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garment and low-end electronic products manufacturing, Singapore was already 
moving into other directions aggressively, firstly into capital-intensive and later 
technology-intensive and then innovation- and knowledge-based industries.  Such 
transition has been made possible to a large extent with the help of a very liberal 
external economic policy, which allows Singapore-based companies, especially the 
MNCs, to import raw materials and equipment without trade barriers, and have easy 
access to capital and labour (both unskilled and skilled) regionally and globally, 
making it possible for Singapore to successfully attract the type of companies it needs 
to help restructure the economy at different stages of its development. 
 
2.63. Singapore’s external economic policy has put it in a position of potential 
conflict with other ASEAN countries.  For example, since 1998, Singapore has 
concluded a number of bilateral FTAs with economies outside ASEAN (see Table 7 
in Part 1c) when, as part of the AFTA, it should formalise FTAs under the ASEAN 
framework.  The city-state’s comprehensive and accelerated approach towards free 
trade also adds pressure to its relationships with other ASEAN economies, which are 
taking a more gradual approach to achieving trade liberalisation.  Its trade 
liberalisation in such areas as agriculture and the service sector, and its liberal policy 
towards capital and labour movements arguably places it in a position that is closer to 
the developed west than its ASEAN counterparts.  Such differences could pose 
challenges to the city-state’s economic integration with the region. 
 
2.64.   While the city-state preferred a much faster pace of regional economic 
integration, it also recognised the difficulty of achieving this goal, as well as the 
negative repercussion it could face if it were to push the issue through too 
aggressively.  Indeed, from 1976 to 1998, ASEAN achieved relatively little in terms 
of actual economic integration, despite all the positive rhetoric and the signing of the 
AFTA in 1993 as mentioned in paragraph 2.15 above.   
 
2.65. Notwithstanding the slow progress of ASEAN economic integration, 
Singapore was able to enjoy the economic benefits of a fast growing ASEAN, thanks 
to the majority of the city-state’s trade with its major trading partners, including 
ASEAN member states, being conducted bilaterally, rather than through the ASEAN 
framework.   Still, Singapore continued to contribute to the process of ASEAN 
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integration and support further economic cooperation within ASEAN by being one of 
the most vocal proponents of the need for ASEAN to focus single-mindedly on 
economic development, an idea which, by the 1980s, had become a consensus among 
ASEAN countries. 
 
2.66. The emphasis on economic growth and development forced ASEAN countries 
to put a high premium on political stability.  While the US’ heavy military presence in 
the region had helped in this regard, there was increasing recognition that such 
security effort needed to be supplemented, especially in the light of the invasion of 
Cambodia by Vietnam in 1979, which heightened the fears of the spread of 
communism and military intervention in the region among ASEAN countries.  
Working with the US, the grouping launched a series of UN-sponsored initiatives to 
force Vietnam to withdraw from the occupied territory.  The resultant peace and 
stability in the region (outside Indo-China) provided the basis needed for sustained 
economic growth.     
 
2.67. Singapore also made some efforts in a bid to reduce potential tensions with 
other ASEAN countries.  Firstly, Singapore made it clear that it would follow the 
principle of “WTO-consistent open regionalism” in its regional integration strategy.  
Singapore has always been active in ensuring that the agenda of the ASEAN free 
trade negotiations are as consistent with that of the General Agreement of Tariffs and 
Trade and later WTO as possible.  Following the establishment of the WTO in 
January 1995 (the inaugural meeting was hosted by Singapore), the agenda of global 
free trade negotiations was broadened to include General Agreement on Trade in 
Services, Trade-Related Measures on Foreign Direct Investment and Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property.  Singapore has since been playing an active role in 
bringing these agenda into the ASEAN free trade negotiations, which helped narrow 
the policy gap between ASEAN and the WTO and in turn, that between ASEAN and 
Singapore.  Meanwhile, the consensus-based decision-making process within the 
grouping suggests that while Singapore’s position might represent that of the most 
developed member country, the concerns of the less developed member countries 
were not neglected.   
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2.68. Secondly, Singapore has been pro-active in helping to close the development 
gap between the more developed ASEAN economies and the less developed ones, an 
effort which has gained greater importance after CLMV joined the grouping in the 
1990s.  Various technical assistance and training programmes were provided to help 
raise the standards of trade and investment practices and rules in the less-developed 
member countries. 
 
2.69. While Singapore strives to cultivate closer relationships with its neighbours, it 
was also aggressively pursuing trade and investment opportunities outside the region, 
often working through the global distribution network of the Singapore-based MNCs.  
Given the slow progress of ASEAN integration, Singapore had no choice but to try to 
expand its economic space outside the region.  As a result, its trade and investment 
with the US, Europe and Japan rose sharply.  Singapore’s  attempt in positioning itself 
as a global business service hub during this period also complements this effort.30  
 
2.70. In summary, one could argue that before 1997, Singapore was pursuing a two-
pronged strategy to establish external economic linkages, but with heavy 
concentration on non-ASEAN markets.  Within ASEAN, its approach was one of 
“moving along”, trying to keep the free trade momentum alive without being able to 
fore the pace. 
 
2.71. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Singapore stepped up efforts in 
economic integration within ASEAN.  While the two-pronged strategy remained, 
there was a clear shift in Singapore’s position vis-à-vis ASEAN, which came about as 
ASEAN countries found themselves facing a new reality:  the rise of China and India.  
The rise of these two economic giants presented the grouping with three scenarios: (1) 
as they grow, they exert gravitational pull and tear ASEAN apart; (2) as they grow, 
they take up all the political and economic space and leave little for ASEAN; and (3) 
the region accelerates its own integration, strengthens its own position collectively 
and then finds a way to synergise with these two economies to leverage on their 
strong growth.  The decision was obvious.  For Singapore, the impact of this change 
in regional economic landscape is felt particularly strongly given its heavy reliance on 
                                                 
30  See the next section for more details on Singapore’s hub strategy. 
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MNCs and foreign investment.  Without the “market size” and the production 
hinterland provided by other ASEAN countries, Singapore’s attractiveness to MNCs 
will be severely diminished.  
 
2.72. Another reason for Singapore’s decision to become more aggressive in 
pushing for ASEAN integration after the Asian financial crisis was the realisation of 
the central role that ASEAN could play in a wider East Asia economic grouping.  
ASEAN, as an economic grouping, was too small to respond effectively to any 
region-wide financial or economic crisis, and to be effective in the global economic 
forum.  To strengthen its position, ASEAN decided to expand itself by including three 
of its “dialogue partners”, namely China, Japan and South Korea, to form the 
“ASEAN+3” grouping.  The expansion was particularly important in the area of 
financial cooperation.  Without their participation, the CMI and the Asia Bond Market 
Initiatives (ABMI), the two main components of the post-Asia crisis regional financial 
architecture, would have been meaningless.  
 
2.73. ASEAN was widely perceived to be playing a pivotal role in the formation of 
a wider East Asia grouping, largely because it was seen as a neutral party.  The larger 
grouping allowed the three economies to avoid the tensions that could arise in a 
bilateral free trade negotiation.  The leaders of ASEAN countries recognised this and 
seized the opportunity to build the ASEAN+3 framework.31  Given Singapore’s close 
economic relations with the three Northeast Asian economies, especially China and 
Japan, and given the wider economic linkages Singapore enjoyed compared with 
other ASEAN countries, the city-state was well-positioned to push this initiative 
forward. 
 
2.74. Singapore took a leading role on two fronts: to force a more rapid and more 
comprehensive economic integration within ASEAN, and to initiate FTAs between 
ASEAN and other economies.  The AEC project, conceived in 2003 and scheduled to 
be launched in 2015, is a major step ahead for ASEAN.  It aims to take ASEAN 
economic integration way beyond the AFTA, and to achieve free trade not only in 
                                                 
31   See Tan Kim Song and Khor Hoe Ee, “China’s Changing Economic Structure and 
Implications for Regional patterns of Trade, Production and Integration”, in China and World Economy, 
Vol 14, No.6, Nov-Dec 2006.  Blackwell Publishing. 
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goods and services but also in capital and labour.  If successful, the initiative will 
create one of the largest single markets in the world and greatly enhance ASEAN’s 
economic competitiveness.  Singapore, together with Indonesia, has been the main 
driving force behind this initiative. 
 
2.75. Given its experience in negotiating with other developed economies, it is not 
surprising that Singapore is leading the efforts to increase and extend intra-ASEAN 
trade in services and to facilitate freer movements of capital and labour, within the 
ASEAN Framework Agreement.  By tightening the internal agreements, ASEAN will 
be in a stronger position when negotiating with other dialogue partners over FTAs.  
 
2.76. Singapore is also striving to narrow the developmental gaps among ASEAN 
countries through, amongst others, its involvement in sub-regions within ASEAN.  
For example, Singapore is one of the largest contributors to the IAI fund introduced 
by ASEAN to close the development gap between the more developed ASEAN 
members and the CLMV members (See Table 6 in section 1b).  Singapore has been 
one of the largest investors and a significant provider of technical assistance to the 
CLMV countries, under the GMS initiative.  As the bulk of Singapore’s investment in 
GMS has gone to Vietnam, IE Singapore, the city-state’s agency dealing with private 
sector commercial activities in the region, has set up an office in the country.  Some 
of Singapore’s investments in the GMS countries take place through indirect channels 
such as the tendering system of the Asian Development Bank (ADB).  This is 
especially so in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. 
 
2.77. Singapore has played a leading role in starting the free trade negotiations 
between ASEAN and other countries, including China, Japan, India, Australia and 
New Zealand, etc.  In fact, Singapore’s bilateral FTAs concluded with the five said 
countries in recent years acted as impetus for ASEAN members to overcome their 
disagreements in forging multilateral FTAs with these partners.  For instance, 
ASEAN’s FTA with Japan, which came into effect in 2008, was concluded after 
Singapore signed its FTA with Japan in 2002.  The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand 
FTA was concluded in 2009 after Singapore established its FTA with Australia and 
New Zealand in 2003 and 2000 respectively.  As for ASEAN’s FTA with China, 
although it was implemented in 2005, ahead of Singapore’s FTA with China in 2008, 
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the Singapore-China FTA pushed ASEAN members to expand the coverage of its 
FTA with China by including liberalising services and investment.   
 
2.78. Singapore is also at the centre of the various ASEAN+3 cooperation schemes.  
Given the city-state’s close trade and investment relationships with China and Japan, 
a greater integration brought about by ASEAN+3 will benefit Singapore directly.  
Singapore has worked closely with the three northeast Asian economies in 
conceptualising the CMI, the ABMI and the design of the region-wide surveillance 
and risk management mechanisms.  
 
 
(c) Private sector initiatives 
 
2.79. The Singapore economy and the business community today are dominated by 
two major players: the MNCs and the large GLCs.  However, this was not always the 
case.  In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a thriving private sector in Singapore, 
dominated by ethnic Chinese.  The sector included major conglomerates as well as 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Their business activities span across both the 
manufacturing and the service industries. Many of them had cross-border businesses 
with operations spreading across different ASEAN countries.  The three major banks 
in Singapore during that period, the Overseas Chinese Bank, UOB and Overseas 
Union Bank, for example, had strong presence in Malaysia and other ASEAN 
countries. 
 
2.80. Over the years, as the government carried out its industrialisation programme 
and its various strategic economic initiatives, the commercial space was gradually 
ceded to the MNCs and the GLCs.  The GLCs are supposed to work on the principle 
of “public ownership and private operation”.  They are profit-driven and the 
management is rewarded according to their commercial performance.  Together with 
the MNCs, they are the vehicles through which the government restructures the 
economy.  The private sector companies that remained are largely SMEs, especially in 
the service sector. 
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2.81. Given the dominance of the MNCs and the GLCs, it is not surprising that the 
private sector’s role in Singapore’s regional economic integration drive was limited.  
Nevertheless, their input is still sought by the Singapore government to facilitate the 
formulation of the regional integration strategies.  For instance, the government set up 
the Singapore Business Federation in 2002 to provide a platform for Singapore’s 
private sector to voice their opinions regarding domestic needs and their overseas 
business interests.   
 
2.82. IE Singapore is the official agency dealing with private sector companies’ 
regional activities.  It has two main functions:  to help Singapore companies start and 
develop their business overseas, and to promote trade between Singapore and its 
partners.  It achieves the former functions mainly through conducting assessments on 
market opportunities available in various countries, and providing a platform for 
Singapore businessmen to establish contacts with the relevant players, such as 
business partners or key politicians in the selected industry, through their offices set 
up in those countries.  In addition, the agency is responsible for the promotion of 
Singapore as a hub for offshore trading and re-exports activities, with emphasis on the 
city-state’s strength in logistics facilities (e.g. airport and seaport) and other facilities 
and services relevant to offshore trading (e.g. offshore banks, free port, etc). 
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3. Singapore’s Role and Contribution to Regional Integration: As a Conduit 
for the Region to the Global Economy and Complementing the 
Comparative Advantages of the Region 
 
 
2.83. Singapore’s ability to serve as a conduit for the ASEAN region to the global 
economy is largely underpinned by its strategy to establish itself as a regional hub.  
This strategy was devised in 1985 when the government set up an Economic 
Committee in the MTI to work out a new development and globalisation strategy that 
would induce sustainable growth by continuing the restructuring process in the 
manufacturing sector and synergising it with the service sector.  Headed by then 
Minister of Trade and Industry Lee Hsien Loong, the committee proposed 
transforming Singapore into a total business centre where foreign MNCs were able to 
set up their production base and carry out their operations before production (e.g. 
R&D and production engineering) and operations after production (e.g. marketing and 
regional management).  In other words, Singapore is to become a RHQ for MNCs. 
 
2.84. To attract MNCs to Singapore, the government set up a RHQs incentive 
system in 1986 to provide qualified MNCs with incentives such as lower corporate 
tax.  Local service providers from areas such as banking and financial services, 
communication and transportation and other business and professional consultancy 
services were encouraged to upgrade and expand their operations and to position 
themselves as strategic partners for the MNCs.  This gave the Singapore’s service 
sector a complete turnaround as the new services replaced traditional entrepot services 
as the main drivers of growth of the service sector. 
 
2.85. Government assistance was provided for the establishment of the new services.  
The benefits given in the Economic Expansion Incentive Act of 1967 which provides 
significant tax reliefs for companies willing to venture into value-added industries 
was extended to the service sector, particularly in consultancy, engineering and other 
business-related services.  The government also took measures to step up manpower 
development by emphasising on better training and education in fields such as 
accounting, banking, finance and law.  Furthermore, it relaxed immigration policies to 
attract foreign talents from those fields. 
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2.86. The government also introduced plans to build up and improve the efficiency 
of Singapore’s infrastructure, so as to maintain Singapore’s status as a major 
transportation and communication hub.  These included improving the city-state’s air 
and sea transportation infrastructure and expanding its telecommunications and 
information functions.  Land reclamation projects were also carried out to expand 
industrial areas to provide space for the manufacturing and petroleum and 
petrochemical industries. 
 
2.87. In addition, the government began formulating strategies to develop the 
private sector by introducing the SME Master Plan in 1988.  As Singapore’s domestic 
market was relatively small, the government encouraged local SMEs to adopt a global 
perspective and expand their operations to countries that offer better comparative 
advantages.  This was to enhance Singapore’s hub strategy as private companies 
could establish themselves as strategic business partners with MNCs.  To provide the 
platform for SMEs to expand overseas, the government initiated a number of 
economic cooperation initiatives with its immediate neighbours.  One example was 
the formation the Growth Triangle linking Singapore, Johor and Batam.  This was 
later followed by economic and investment cooperation initiatives in emerging 
economies such as China, India and Vietnam through the establishment of industrial 
parks in the early 1990s.  The government also invested heavily in public funds and 
expanded government assistance to provide local SMEs with the financial capabilities 
to invest overseas. 
 
2.88. Apart from providing world-class hardware and software, the government 
complemented its hub strategy with the improving and deepening of Singapore’s 
regional linkages.  This process requires Singapore to maintain a comprehensive 
coverage of its free trade policy32, the purpose of which is to address the constraints 
Singapore faces as a small city-state with no hinterland or a sizeable domestic market, 
and to ensure that Singapore has global economic linkages, an essential feature to 
convince MNCs to locate their headquarters in Singapore to manage their production 
network in the region. 
 
                                                 
32  See Section 1(c) of Part I of the report for details on Singapore’s FTAs and economic 
cooperation beyond the ASEAN region. 
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2.89. The hub strategy also calls for building good relations with regional countries. 
Through political and economic cooperation, Singapore and its partners are able to 
combine competitive strengths to attract international investors.  Singapore’s good 
relations with its neighbours are fostered through various channels such as 
multilateral and bilateral frameworks, outward investment and joint ventures. 
 
2.90. All in all, the hub strategy is to establish Singapore as a major regional hub.  
Complementary policies aiming to allow Singapore’s economy to remain globalised, 
pro-business and liberalised were introduced at both domestic and external levels to 
facilitate this process.  These policies also seek to provide MNCs with a platform for 
splitting production processes and distributing different activities to locations in the 
ASEAN region according to the competitive advantage of each.  In a way, the success 
of Singapore’s hub strategy is also dependent on the integration of ASEAN as well as 
the stability and competitiveness of its member states. 
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PART II: DYNAMICS OF SINGAPORE’S CHANGING ROLE IN 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
 
(a)  How Singapore formulates its regional integration policies and the major 
considerations and constraints it faces; why and how it changes its policy 
emphasis over time 
 
Formulating Singapore’s Economic and Business Interests in ASEAN 
 
3.1. Singapore’s overseas investment is decided by IE Singapore, a statutory board 
within the MTI.  IE Singapore has two main functions.  First, it helps Singapore 
companies start and develop their business overseas, which is part of Singapore’s 
economic strategy to internationalise Singapore companies so that they can grow in an 
increasingly global market.  To do so, IE Singapore will assess the market opportunity 
in the selected country by examining such factors as the strategic economic and trade 
linkages it has with Singapore, the sectors with the biggest growth potential, and the 
potential challenges it faces (e.g. competitors and size of market).  Offices are also set 
up in the targeted country to provide Singapore businessmen with a platform to 
establish contacts with relevant players such as business partners or key officials in 
the selected industry, and to foster their awareness and understanding of the business 
opportunities in the country. 
 
3.2. Second, IE Singapore promotes trade between Singapore and its partners 
through the promotion of Singapore as a hub for offshore trading and re-exports 
activities.  IE Singapore emphasises on the efficiency of the city-state’s logistics 
facilities (e.g. airport and seaport) and the facilities and services that Singapore can 
provide as an offshore trading hub (e.g. offshore banks, free port, etc.). 
 
Singapore’s Economic and Business Interests in ASEAN 
 
3.3. As noted in Part 2.33 and 2.34 of this report, Singapore’s economic and 
business interests in ASEAN is to expand its own limited economic space by 
leveraging on the diverse comparative advantages that individual ASEAN countries 
offer.  This has helped Singapore, over time, to attract MNCs to set up production 
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bases in the city state, and to create an “external wing” for Singapore’s own 
companies. 
 
3.4. Singapore has been actively promoting the concept of a “second wing” for the 
economy by encouraging its companies to invest overseas, including ASEAN 
countries.  The establishment of the SIJORI Growth Triangle in the 1990s linking 
Singapore with the Riau Islands of Indonesia and the State of Johor in Malaysia, for 
example, provides a platform for Singapore’s labour-intensive industries such as the 
textile, furniture and electronic industries to relocate to the other two participating 
countries where they can enjoy the better comparative advantages.  
 
3.5. Today, manufacturing industries continue to be the preferred form of overseas 
investment by Singapore enterprises, although they also venture into other industries 
with higher technological content and added value.  Geographically, Singapore’s 
overseas investment has expanded beyond ASEAN to countries such as China, the 
Middle East and Latin America. 
 
3.6. IE Singapore is also encouraging Singapore companies investing overseas to 
exploit the comparative advantage that Singapore possesses as a city-state economy. 
For example, Singapore companies with relevant expertise can provide urban 
solutions (e.g. infrastructure projects, utility supplies, real-estate development and 
airports and seaports) to emerging economies such as China and Vietnam as well as 
mega-cities such as Jakarta.  IE Singapore also helps Singapore companies from the 
food and beverages sector to acquire resources for their businesses, such as getting 
land in Vietnam and China for the establishment of pig-farms or plantations. 
 
Singapore’s Economic and Business Interests in the GMS 
 
3.7. Singapore’s investment interest in the GMS is concentrated mainly in Vietnam.  
Besides the high growth performance of the Indo-Chinese country, Singapore’s 
interest in Vietnam is also spurred by the latter’s large domestic market and its 
perceived political stability.  Vietnam’s open economy as well as its deep trade 
linkages with Singapore makes an additional advantage.  In order to facilitate 
Singapore enterprises to invest in Vietnam, IE Singapore has set up offices in the 
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country.  Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also took extra effort to maintain 
good relations with the Vietnamese government.   
 
3.8. Apart from Vietnam, Singapore investment is also found in Cambodia and 
Laos, due to the low costs and high growth potential they offer.  Some Singapore 
companies also participate in projects funded by the ADB and the World Bank.  IE 
Singapore maintains an office in the ADB, and its representative serves as a bridge for 
Singapore companies, in addition to contributing to ADB development projects 
through the provision of expert advices drawing from Singapore’s own experience, 
amongst others. 
 
3.9. As for the Beibu Gulf Rim Economic Circle Cooperation, there are still no 
strategic projects available for Singapore overseas investment in the cooperation 
framework yet.  There are also concerns about the business opportunities available 
under the cooperation, judging from the limited range of products exhibited in 
Nanning trade expo.   
  
Singapore’s FTA Strategy  
 
3.10. Singapore concludes FTAs with major partners because it wants to gain a 
head-start in accessing the economic opportunities that come with the FTAs.  The 
FTA negotiation is overseen by the MTI, while the implementation is carried out by 
IE Singapore, which plays a major role in informing Singapore businesses about how 
they can benefit from the FTAs.  Singapore would only start negotiating for an FTA 
with a country after it has acquired enough knowledge of the business environment in 
that country.  The city-state places great importance on the policy consistency of the 
countries it signs FTAs with, including having an open economy and a stable 
government. 
 
Considerations and Constraints  
 
3.11. Singapore’s role in ASEAN has evolved considerably.  Singapore’s role in 
ASEAN was restricted in the past by its unique demography.  Unlike other ASEAN 
members, Singapore is a Chinese dominated city with over 80% of its population 
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being ethnically Chinese. Singapore’s rapid economic development and its being the 
most developed economy in Southeast Asia further accentuated its awkward position.  
As such, Singapore has always been sensitive in dealing with its ASEAN partners and 
was for a long time reluctant to adopt an overt leadership role.  From its initial attempt 
to shy away from leadership, Singapore has risen to become a prominent proponent of 
ASEAN economic integration.  In its interaction with ASEAN, Singapore pursues a 
parallel strategy where it engages ASEAN actively but does not allow itself to be 
constrained by the limits of ASEAN.   
 
3.12. Another unique ASEAN arrangement that works towards Singapore’s 
advantage is that it works by consensus rather than by simple vote of majority.  This 
means that every single member has to understand and agree on every action that 
ASEAN is taking.  Not only does this help avoid a situation where member states are 
subject to the tyranny of the majority, but also provide more active members such as 
Singapore with the opportunity to spearhead projects legitimately.  
 
3.13. Singapore’s role in the region changes along with the evolution of ASEAN. 
Inertia by other ASEAN countries made it difficult for Singapore to push forward 
aggressive trade liberalisation measures in ASEAN during the early years of its 
history.  Singapore’s trade and investment links with ASEAN in that period came 
largely from Malaysia and Indonesia, its two immediate neighbours and natural 
economic hinterland. 
 
3.14. With the rise of China and India in the late 1990s, ASEAN saw the need for 
greater economic integration in a bid to maintain the grouping’s competitiveness in 
the midst of the changing economic landscape in the region.  FTAs were concluded 
between ASEAN and other dialogue partners such as China, Australia and New 
Zealand and various platforms were also established within the ASEAN framework to 
promote specific industry cooperation, such as the ASEAN Tourism Forum (ATF). 
 
3.15. While intra-ASEAN tourism is competitive in nature, the ASEAN leaders 
realised that there is room for cooperation if they market the region together to long 
haul tourists from other regions such as Europe or America.  ATF has six taskforces 
headed by various ASEAN members based on their strengths.  Singapore currently 
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heads the Cruise and Crisis Communications taskforces, but is also very active in 
other taskforces such as Manpower and Standards.  Through these platforms, 
Singapore is able to integrate better with its fellow ASEAN members through the 
sharing of capabilities. 
 
3.16. At times, the principle of consensus may hinder the progress of ASEAN 
integration.  The ATF for example, had been consistently starved of funds, yet the 
members are unable to increase the amount of funding because the less developed 
members are reluctant and, at times, unable to contribute more than the current 
US$80,000 annually.  Similarly, ASEAN’s progress in signing FTAs with its dialogue 
partners has often been slowed by the economic gaps among its members.  Cambodia, 
Laos and Myanmar in particular are cautious about the effects of opening up their 
economies to developed countries such as Australia and New Zealand, and question 
the benefits they are able to reap.  
 
3.17. To avoid the delay of its own economic progress, Singapore adopts a parallel 
strategy in forging its relationship with other countries.  While Singapore is a 
committed member of ASEAN, it does not feel that it needs to act only as a member 
of ASEAN, hence its decision to sign bilateral FTAs with non-ASEAN countries in 
recent years. 
 
3.18. This parallel strategy has benefited Singaporean businesses and given them 
head-starts against their ASEAN competitors. Singapore’s private sector, however, 
prefers to operate in well established markets rather than venture into uncharted 
grounds.  Hence, in order to fully leverage on FTAs and emerging economies such as 
Vietnam and Cambodia, the Singapore government has to play an active role through 
the help of the GLCs.   
 
(b) How other countries in the region, especially ASEAN countries, view the role 
and contribution of Singapore to regional economic integration and how 
Singapore in turn works with the diverse expectations of these countries. 
 
 
3.19. ASEAN today is an organisation with a strong economic emphasis.  The 
regional stability brought about by the organisation has helped create an environment 
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for economic development.  Singapore is seen by some as the unofficial “Capital 
City” of ASEAN.  
 
3.20. Indonesia, on the other hand, is seen as the “Big Brother” of ASEAN, playing 
a leading role in both political and economic realms for a large part of ASEAN’s 
history.  Indonesia sees Singapore as an active player which has effectively utilised 
the ASEAN platform to acquire more political and economic space.  Yet some felt 
that Singapore had too much political consideration and could have achieved more for 
both Singapore and ASEAN if it were willing to adopt a stronger leadership role.  For 
example, due to Singapore’s political prudence, it had offered the leadership role of 
the AEC, which was originally the city-state’s brainchild, to Indonesia.  If Singapore 
had retained the leadership role, the AEC progress would have greatly benefited from 
Singapore’s economic strength and efficiency.  
 
3.21. Among the ASEAN nations, Malaysia has the most unique relationship with 
Singapore.  Being once a united country, the relationship carries with it a certain 
amount of historical baggage.  Yet, Malaysia is also Singapore’s largest trading 
partner and both nations have cooperated economically at various levels.  Malaysia 
often criticises Singapore for being “overly pragmatic” and not giving sufficient 
consideration to the interest of ASEAN as a group.  Nevertheless, Malaysia 
appreciates Singapore’s effort in ensuring that ASEAN remains a platform that is 
largely fair to all its members. 
 
3.22. Thailand sees Singapore’s role in ASEAN generally in positive terms.  Being 
heavily involved in the GMS, Thailand has witnessed, at first hand, Singapore’s effort 
in capability building and sharing with the less developed countries such as Cambodia, 
Laos and Myanmar.  Singapore’s involvement in the region has even caused Thailand 
to potentially view it as a competitor for the leadership role in the sub-region.  
 
3.23. The Philippines has not been as active a member as some other ASEAN 
countries in economic cooperation.  It sees Singapore’s role in ASEAN largely in 
neutral terms although it is often critical of Singapore’s less than “liberal” approach in 
handling ASEAN matters, especially in non-economic issues.  
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3.24. Vietnam sees Singapore as a sophisticated player in ASEAN, and is impressed 
by how Singapore raises and pushes issues in ASEAN despite its size.  Vietnam is 
traditionally the informal leader in the Indo-China region, but it does not resent 
Singapore’s effort in modernising the region with its technology transfer programme, 
nor is it concerned about Singapore’s influence in the sub-region.  In official meetings, 
Vietnam has consistently been supportive of Singapore’s position. 
 
3.25. Both Laos and Cambodia view Singapore in a very positive light.  Not only 
are they beneficiaries of Singapore’s capability sharing programme, they have also 
witnessed how Singapore achieves its prosperity despite being a small state.  
Myanmar is somewhat detached from the ASEAN agenda and activities but it still has 
a positive view on Singapore’s role.  Singapore is able to exert a certain degree of 
influence over Myanmar on ASEAN issues. 
 
3.26. Brunei adopts a very low profile within ASEAN.  It has a special and close 
relationship with Singapore, having enjoyed almost a monetary union with Singapore 
for many years.  
 
3.27. In summary, most ASEAN members view Singapore in a very positive light 
mainly due to three reasons.  Firstly, Singapore’s achievement has become an 
inspiration to many of these nations, making Singapore a certain role-model which 
these nations look up to.  Secondly, Singapore’s political prudence, small size, 
adherence to ASEAN’s principle of consensus and other similar policies have assured 
these nations that Singapore is not fighting for economic or political leadership in the 
region.  Thirdly, Singapore has also been bringing benefits to these nations through 
investments and capability sharing.  
 
3.28. As ASEAN grows in sophistication, Singapore sees a greater need to increase 
its participation in the organisation and to harness the ASEAN platform for economic 
gains.  While other ASEAN countries may not agree completely with Singapore’s 
pragmatic approach, they nevertheless appreciate Singapore’s participation in 
assisting other member nations.  Singapore is well aware of the fact that while its 
economic achievement does give it some informal authority, it could also be seen as 
over-profiting from ASEAN.  As such, it continues to adopt a prudent approach in its 
 57
participation in the grouping, an approach which has generally paid off in a way that 
allows Singapore enjoy a good relationship with its fellow ASEAN members.  
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PART III: RELEVANCE OF SINGAPORE’S EXPERIENCE FOR 
HONG KONG 
 
1. Comparing Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s Economic Development 
 
4.1. Singapore and Hong Kong share many similarities in their growth experiences 
and the challenges they face.  Both were former British colonies and as such inherited 
a similar legal and public service system. Both started off primarily as entrepot 
economies with a strong dependence on their respective hinterlands – China for Hong 
Kong and ASEAN in general, and Malaysia and Indonesia, in particular, for 
Singapore.  Both economies moved on to adopt an export-oriented industrialisation 
strategy in the 1970s to capitalise on the cost advantages they enjoyed.  Since then, 
both have tried to move up the value-added chain to provide higher value-added 
production and also to broaden their production bases.  The economic restructuring 
that took place in both economies over the years was a response not only to the 
changing global economic environment, but also to the changing political and 
economic relationships between them and their respective hinterlands.   
 
4.2. Today, Singapore and Hong Kong are at approximately the same level of 
economic development, and enjoy about the same level of per capita GDP US$32,470 
for Singapore and US$31,610 Hong Kong in 2008.  Both are among the most open 
economies in the world with total export value of 231% and 207% of GDP in 
Singapore and Hong Kong respectively.  Structurally, Singapore’s economy is more 
broad-based. with manufacturing and services industries accounting for 32% and 68% 
of its GDP respectively in 2008.  Hong Kong, on the other hand, is primarily a 
service-oriented economy.  In 2008, 92% of its GDP was contributed by its services 
sector.  Manufacturing accounted for only 8% of GDP.33 
 
4.3. The external economic relations and policy of Hong Kong and Singapore are 
intimately linked to the changes in their domestic economic structures.  Here the two 
economies differ.  In Hong Kong’s case, China dominates the whole economic 
restructuring process.  Manufacturing industries moved en mass into Guangdong after 
China’s economic reform and opening up in the 1980s and 1990s, leaving Hong Kong 
                                                 
33  From Economists Intelligence Unit Country View database. 
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with mainly the services sector as the key contributor to GDP.  Hong Kong’s external 
trade pattern is to a large extent a reflection of China’s external trade pattern.  The 
restructuring has resulted in a deeper integration with its hinterland and led to a sharp 
de-industrialisation in Hong Kong.  On the other hand, this has also strengthened 
Hong Kong’s position as an entrepot and service-oriented economy.  As Hong Kong 
has remained largely a laissez faire economy, much of the restructuring has worked 
through the private sector.  Companies moved across the border to leverage on the 
different comparative advantages of China and Hong Kong.  
 
4.4. Beijing has also helped facilitate the process by easing the movement of goods, 
services, capital and people.  One such measure is the introduction of the CEPA 
which was signed in June 2003 and came into effect on 1 January 2004.  CEPA 
allows qualified Hong Kong-based companies and professionals to gain greater access 
to the Mainland market ahead of China’s WTO timetable, thus brings the economic 
integration between Hong Kong and China to a higher level. 
 
4.5. In Singapore, the government has always played a leading role in the 
restructuring of the economy, mostly through adapting the trade and foreign 
investment policies to the economic needs of the city-state.  The relationship between 
Singapore and its traditional hinterland of ASEAN countries (especially Malaysia and 
Indonesia) has undergone a number of changes over the years.  As Singapore 
industrialised and moved up the technological production chain in the first three 
decades of its history (1965 till late 1990s), it was compelled to take a “global” rather 
than “regional” approach in its quest for export markets and to reduce its reliance on 
its traditional hinterland.  The failure of ASEAN to make significant progress in trade 
liberalisation during this period further reinforced Singapore’s belief that it had to 
move beyond the region and focus on the global market that could provide a source of 
robust economic growth for the city-state.   
 
4.6. As explained in the previous Part, the experience of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, which demonstrated the need for effective regional economic cooperation 
measures, together with the emergence of China and India as two new economic 
powers in Asia, forced the Singapore government to re-assess its external economic 
strategies.  It recognised the importance of having an economically integrated 
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ASEAN as its hinterland to respond effectively to the challenges posed by China and 
India, especially in attracting foreign investment.  In the past decade, Singapore has 
become much more pro-active in helping to strengthen ASEAN and to accelerate the 
economic integration process, not just in trade and investment but also in financial 
and other areas of economic cooperation.  Unlike the case of Hong Kong, Singapore’s 
efforts in ASEAN integration are driven by the Singapore government and in the form 
of diplomacy.  The private sector has played only a passive role in this process. 
 
2. Singapore’s Regional and Sub-Regional Policies vis-a-vis ASEAN 
 
4.7. The relationship Singapore has with ASEAN, its traditional hinterland, is very 
complex.  All ASEAN countries are independent sovereign states.  The economic pact 
between them, the AFTA, is still a loose structure, with limited legal enforceability.  It 
is the vast differences among ASEAN countries in political, cultural and economic 
structures that complicate the relationships among them and hinder the grouping’s 
economic integration.  Further complicating the matter is the requirement that all 
major ASEAN policies should be made only on a consensus basis.   
 
4.8. Historically and culturally, ASEAN countries are very different from each 
other, ranging from the Hindu-Buddhist countries of Thailand, Cambodia and 
Myanmar, to the Muslim countries of Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, the Catholic 
countries like the Philippines and the socialist countries like Vietnam and Laos.  Such 
differences in cultures and religions had given rise to a lot of political tensions and 
territorial disputes among the neighbouring countries.  Seen in that context, it is 
understandable why ASEAN focused more on resolving political differences than 
promoting economic integration in its early phase. 
 
4.9. Singapore stands out as the only Chinese-majority state within ASEAN.  
While the population has a multi-racial composition, it is made up predominantly of 
ethnic Chinese (80% of the population).  In terms of social development, Singapore 
shares a lot more similarities with Northeast Asian societies such as Hong Kong, 
China and Taiwan then its Southeast Asian neighbours.  As an English speaking city-
state, Singapore is also considerably more cosmopolitan than its ASEAN counterparts.  
Such political and cultural differences help explain why Singapore does not always 
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see eye to eye with its ASEAN neighbours in the conduct of foreign and economic 
policies. 
 
4.10. The stages of economic development and economic structures of countries in 
the ASEAN region also vary.  The per capita GDP in 2008 in Southeast Asia ranged 
from US$32,470 in Singapore to US$334 in Myanmar.  Most of the ASEAN member 
countries have a large agricultural sector which continues to employs a considerable 
part, if not the majority, of their workforces.  The degree of industrialisation varies 
widely across the region too, with Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore having a 
significantly larger manufacturing sector than the rest.  While almost all ASEAN 
countries adopt an open, outward-looking economic policy, their dependence on 
exports and their degree of economic openness differ greatly.  Countries like 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam have large domestic markets which allow 
them considerable flexibility in economic policy making and help reduce their 
dependence on ASEAN as an economic hinterland. 
 
4.11. Despite the ASEAN’s limited progress in economic integration in the first 30 
years of its formation, the grouping did succeed in forging political consensus and 
resolving political differences among member countries during this period.  Under the 
ASEAN framework, a number of member countries were able to reach an amicable 
agreement with regard to their border disputes, such as those between Malaysia and 
the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand etc.  While such political progress has not led 
to accelerated economic integration in the region, it nevertheless allowed individual 
member countries to concentrate on their economic growth and development.  This 
has helped the less developed ASEAN countries to catch up with their more 
developed counterparts at a much faster speed than otherwise possible.  Such 
convergence in turn helped align their economic priorities and objectives and laid the 
foundation for more effective economic integration in future. 
 
4.12. As a small country, Singapore is keenly aware of the need to maintain a 
peaceful and interdependent political environment in the region, both as an end itself 
and as an important base for promoting economic growth.  It also understands very 
well the imperative of maintaining a free trade policy both regionally and globally.  
As such, it has always been a strong supporter of economic integration initiatives 
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within ASEAN despite the lacklustre efforts of other member countries, even during 
the early days of ASEAN’s history. 
 
4.13. However, Singapore’s efforts were often hindered by the lack of common 
understanding from other ASEAN countries. Being one of the smallest, yet 
economically most advanced countries in ASEAN and a city-state with hardly any 
natural resources, it has very different comparative advantages from those of its 
neighbours, and in turn a very different set of economic priorities, objectives and 
structure from the rest of ASEAN member countries.  And as what some described as 
the “capital city of ASEAN”, Singapore depends on and will benefit a lot more from 
an economically integrated ASEAN than other member countries.  It is therefore not 
surprising that Singapore “stands out” among ASEAN countries and often finds itself 
out of line with the rest of ASEAN members over many regional issues.  Some 
ASEAN member countries, for example, were suspicious about Singapore’s motives 
when it vigorously pushed for accelerating the pace and broadening the scope of 
economic integration.  Discordance between Singapore and its ASEAN counterparts 
crops up from time to time, particularly over the distribution of costs and benefits of 
regional economic integration.  
 
4.14. Managing the different perceptions and expectations among ASEAN members 
about Singapore’s role and contribution within the grouping has long been a major 
challenge for the Singapore government.  The issue has also hindered Singapore’s 
efforts in integrating its own economy with those of other ASEAN countries.  In this 
regard, Singapore’s experience was very different from the dynamics of the 
integration process between Hong Kong and China. 
 
4.15. Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the gap in perception between Singapore 
and the other ASEAN countries has narrowed considerably.  A common sense of 
urgency in dealing with the crisis and the challenges posed by the rise of China and 
India forced the 10-member countries to put some of their differences aside in order to 
work towards a common agenda.  The unveiling of the AEC concept was the fruit of 
such changed circumstances.  There was also strong impetus from the three major 
Northeast Asian countries, namely China, Japan and South Korea, to see ASEAN play 
a central role in building a wider East Asian community in the form of the ASEAN+3 
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grouping.  The three countries’ willingness to start negotiating for an FTA with 
ASEAN as a single entity helps inject a greater group momentum into ASEAN. 
 
4.16. Singapore was able to seize the opportunity to help change the dynamics 
within the grouping in a number of ways.  Its decision to negotiate bilateral FTAs 
with non-ASEAN countries demonstrated its determination to pursue free trade policy 
on its own, if ASEAN was not able to make further progress.  Within the short span of 
a few years, Singapore concluded a large number of FTAs with various countries (see 
Table 7 in Part 1c).  In making this move, Singapore appeared to have the implicit 
support of Thailand which was initiating its own bilateral FTAs.  Anxious about not 
losing out, some other ASEAN member countries like Malaysia also followed suit.  
These moves raised concerns about the risk of ASEAN disintegration if the group 
failed to move forward in a concerted and cohesive way while individual member 
countries attempted separately to strengthen their own trade ties with non-ASEAN 
countries.  Such a concern helped push member countries to make a stronger 
commitment towards strengthening the grouping. 
 
4.17. The Asian financial crisis also opened up other avenues for more concrete 
ASEAN-wide cooperation, especially in the areas of monetary, financial and 
exchange rate cooperation.  The launch of the CMI and the signing of the various 
swap agreements paved the way for closer ASEAN coordination and integration on 
such matters.  Singapore, the financial hub of the region with strong knowledge base 
on such matters, was able to play a major role in providing the architecture for such 
mechanisms. 
 
4.18. In addition, Singapore has played a key role in securing and strengthening 
ASEAN’s central position in the wider “ASEAN plus” framework, first ASEAN+3 
and then, ASEAN+6 (i,e, inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand).  The wider 
economic grouping is consistent with Singapore’s long-standing embrace of “open 
regionalism”, and would serve to reduce frictions among individual ASEAN members 
and render ASEAN less vulnerable to damages caused by internal conflict.  The city-
state’s first preference is for a global free trade system.  In the absence of such a 
system (and in the light of the failure of WTO to make progress in this regard), 
Singapore prefers as broad an economic grouping as possible.  Given its strong 
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economic ties with the developed economies in the Pacific Rim, Singapore is keen to 
include many of them (Japan, the US, Australia etc) in formal economic groupings.  
The long and deep relationships Singapore enjoys with non-ASEAN economies allow 
it to articulate a clear strategy in connecting them with ASEAN.  To achieve a viable 
“ASEAN plus” arrangement, however, a stronger and more cohesive ASEAN is 
needed.  As part of its effort to strengthen ASEAN, Singapore has been a strong 
supporter of sub-regional economic integration programmes.  It is a major participant 
in the IAI programme launched by ASEAN to close the developmental gaps between 
member countries.  As noted in Part I of this study, since the programme started in 
2001, Singapore has been involved in 33 out of 130 IAI projects through the ASEAN 
framework, and 56 projects on a bilateral basis.  
 
3. Recommendations for Hong Kong to Increase Cooperation with ASEAN 
 
4.20.  The underlying rationale for this study is the argument that it would be in 
Hong Kong’s interest to engage ASEAN more actively on many fronts.  This 
argument is based on the fast changing global and regional economic conditions on 
one hand, and political and economic changes surrounding Hong Kong and China on 
the other.   
 
4.21.  The current global economic crisis has brought to the foreground the many 
problems of excessive globalisation.  Countries are increasingly looking towards 
regional and sub-regional arrangements to help alleviate their domestic economic 
woes.  Rising protectionism in developed countries coupled with the failure of the 
Doha Round of the WTO trade negotiations has further reinforced the general quest 
for a regional or sub-regional solution to the global economic crisis.  Going forward, 
East Asian economies are likely to resort to more bilateral trade arrangements and to 
step up cooperation among themselves through various regional schemes, and 
ASEAN is at the core of the many of these schemes.  Intra-regional trade in East Asia 
has already exceeded 50% of the region’s total trade, and the proportion is set to rise 
further.  Regional demand as an engine of economic growth will become increasingly 
more important for all East Asian economies. 
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4.22.  At the same time, it is clear that China will emerge from the current economic 
crisis a much more important player in the global economy.  China’s total GDP at the 
end of 2008 already stood at US$4.4 trillion (in nominal terms), compared to US$4.9 
trillion for Japan.  According to a projection based on IMF data, by 2010, China (GDP 
at US$ 5.3 trillion) will overtake Japan (US$4.7 trillion) as the world’s second largest 
economy after the US.34   
 
4.23.  Few major economies in the world today are in a better position to get back on 
their feet than China.  With its sound fiscal position and massive foreign reserves it 
has built up over the years, China is widely expected to provide a large part of the 
growth momentum for and play a leading role in the recovery of the global economy. 
This will certainly alter the geo-political and geo-economic make-up of the East Asian 
region significantly. 
 
4.24.  China’s businesses are already “going out” to Southeast Asia through various 
regional schemes.  Hong Kong should capture the new opportunities arising from 
there, and position itself as part, if not the “dragon-head”, of this southward drive 
through various institutional mechanisms under China’s auspices, on some kind of a 
“half representation” status.  
 
4.25.  It will be politically, economically and socially desirable for Hong Kong to 
engage more with ASEAN.  Singapore’s overall experience in engaging the ASEAN 
countries should serve as a useful reference for Hong Kong. 
 
(a) Hong Kong and ASEAN 
 
4.26.  There is a general impression within ASEAN that despite the many 
opportunities available in Southeast Asia, Hong Kong businesses have not been active 
in exploring them.  Neither the Hong Kong government nor the business associations 
in Hong Kong appear to have made conspicuous efforts to invest in or to gain inroads 
into the ASEAN markets.  There is also a common view that a greater presence by the 
Hong Kong businesses will be much welcomed by ASEAN countries.  A greater flow 
                                                 
34   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_future_GDP_estimates_(nominal)  
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of goods and services, as well as capital and labour between Hong Kong and ASEAN, 
will benefit both sides, and help enhance economic linkages between ASEAN and 
China with Hong Kong serving as the conduit.  
 
4.27.  From Hong Kong’s perspective, ASEAN provides a destination for its trade 
and investment activities that would help to diversify its markets.  Competition for 
provision of services in China, particularly banking and financial services is rising 
rapidly.  Beijing’s recent announcement of making Shanghai China’s international 
financial centre by 2020 adds to the reasons for Hong Kong to look for new markets 
outside China for the goods and services it provides.  In respect of production, the 
cost of operating labour-intensive manufacturing activities in China’s coastal region is 
rising fast, pushing many manufacturing plants to relocate, mostly to the interior 
provinces of China.    Some companies, however, are moving their operations to the 
less developed ASEAN countries like Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.   
 
4.28.  With the expected completion of the CAFTA in 2010, trade and investment 
ties between China and ASEAN countries are set to grow more rapidly than before.  
More Chinese businesses can be expected to venture out to Southeast Asia.  Taking 
advantage of its strong comparative advantage in service activities, Hong Kong can be 
an important part of this movement, as well as the “dragon-head” of China’s own sub-
regional arrangements such as the “9 + 2” and the “Beibu Gulf Rim Economic Circle”.  
These will provide another channel to raise the level of Hong Kong’s participation in 
ASEAN economies. 
 
(b)  Singapore’s Experiences in Economic Integration with ASEAN 
 
4.29.  As a SAR within China, Hong Kong does not enjoy the same freedom that 
Singapore has as a sovereign state, in formulating external economic policies.  Neither 
does it appear likely that Hong Kong would be able to formalise economic linkages 
with ASEAN on its own (like signing a formal ASEAN-Hong Kong FTA) anytime 
soon.  However, this should not prevent Hong Kong from seeking closer economic 
relations with ASEAN.  Despite the obvious differences between Hong Kong and 
Singapore in terms of their sovereign status and economic structures, there are aspects 
of Singapore’s experience in economic cooperation with ASEAN that may be useful 
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reference for Hong Kong.  Below are some of the lessons that may be extracted for 
Hong Kong from Singapore’s experience. 
 
(i)  Importance of fostering closer relations with ASEAN 
 
4.30. Economic integration works best between countries whose relationships are 
characterised by understanding, goodwill and trust.  While Hong Kong may not be 
able to conclude any formal economic integration programme with ASEAN, its 
economic links with ASEAN can benefit from a stronger overall relation between the 
two sides, both formally and informally.  Hong Kong currently participates with 
ASEAN countries in organisations like APEC, but the interaction between the two 
sides remains limited.  Efforts should be made to cultivate better understanding with 
ASEAN countries through the establishment of more trade offices in large ASEAN 
states. On their part, ASEAN countries appear ready for such a move.  Singapore’s 
experience shows that understanding the diverse needs and aspirations of the 10 
ASEAN countries and managing the relationships with them can be a challenging task.  
However, as a neutral economic partner without any historical or political baggage, 
Hong Kong could enjoy certain advantages that Singapore does not have, making it 
easier for the SAR to build good trade relations with ASEAN countries.  
 
(ii) Role of the Hong Kong government and the private sector 
 
4.31. The Singapore experience shows that, as a small city state economy, the 
government can play an effective role in strengthening its economic ties with the rest 
of the region.  Despite its small size, Singapore is able to articulate a clear position on 
its external economic strategy, to spell out a strong vision for ASEAN, and to play a 
leading role in shaping the agenda for the grouping.  The Singapore government also 
spearheads efforts to explore new markets or new forms of economic linkages for the 
country.  Its efforts are often backed by a large number of GLCs which are willing to 
take into consideration the objectives of the national strategy when they venture 
abroad.  The close collaboration between the government and the business sector 
(though not necessarily the real private sector) has been effective in helping Singapore 
establish and expand its economic presence within ASEAN and beyond.  
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4.32. The Hong Kong economy is managed on a very different philosophy from that 
of Singapore.  Contrary to the interventionist approach of the Singapore government, 
the success of the Hong Kong economy could be attributed mainly to the laissez faire 
philosophy, with the market relying on the work of the invisible hand and the 
initiative of the private sector.  While there is no reason for Hong Kong to deviate 
from this philosophy that has worked well, it might want to look more closely at the 
mode of collaboration between the government and large corporations in Singapore in 
exploring external economic linkages.   
 
4.33. The GLCs are a unique feature of Singapore, more akin to the State-owned 
enterprises in China than the large corporations in Hong Kong.  They have often 
played the role of a vanguard in establishing Singapore’s presence in new markets 
deemed important by the government.  Given the good relationship that the Hong 
Kong government enjoys with the SAR’s private sector, certain collaboration in 
accessing the ASEAN markets might be possible.  In Singapore, some important 
infrastructure and utilities corporations like the Port of the Singapore Authority and 
the Changi Airport have set up joint business ventures in China and other countries.  
Some Hong Kong companies may also be encouraged to venture into ASEAN with 
the support and facilitation of the Hong Kong government.  In any case, having the 
government play a major role in this process helps align the activities of the business 
sector with that of national objectives. 
 
4.34. IE Singapore, a statutory board within the MTI, plays an active role in 
exploring new markets for Singapore companies.  The scope of IE Singapore’s 
activities has evolved and been broadened considerably over the years, to enhance its 
effectiveness.  Whether this is relevant for its counterpart in Hong Kong, the HKTDC, 
may be looked into.  
 
(iii)  Diversifying Hong Kong’s overdependence on China by cultivating new 
sources of growth. 
 
4.35. Globalisation and regionalism have brought challenges to economies around 
the world.  Singapore has demonstrated time and again through its engagement with 
the regional and global economy that it has to constantly adjust its external strategy to 
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sustain and diversify the city-state’s economic development.  Indeed, Singapore’s 
linkages with advanced countries in the West have contributed the country’s 
economic advancement through the value-added chain of production, and its 
economic engagement with other countries in the region facilitated the building of its 
“external wings” for economic growth.  Hong Kong also has “two doors” for its 
economic growth:  the China hinterland and the international/regional markets.  
Closer economic relations with ASEAN would help open another “door” for Hong 
Kong and activate a new source of economic growth that is independent of the 
Chinese hinterland.  
 
(iv) Leveraging Hong Kong’s comparative advantage vis-à-vis ASEAN  
 
4.36. ASEAN is a dynamic economic region and the comparative advantages of its 
member countries continue to evolve.  Singapore has, over the years, continued to 
redefine its comparative advantage vis-à-vis the other ASEAN countries to ensure that 
it remains relevant to the region, and to make use of new opportunities emerging from 
there.  While Hong Kong may share many similarities with Singapore in terms of its 
economic strengths, it is a different economy with a different structure.  Singapore 
looks to ASEAN as part of its hinterland.  Hong Kong does not necessarily view 
ASEAN the same way.  Hong Kong’s strengths in the services sector and its role as a 
conduit to China provide the city with certain advantages that Singapore may not 
enjoy.  It is therefore advisable for Hong Kong to formulate its own ASEAN strategy. 
 
4.37. There may be opportunities in the areas of tourism, financial services and 
logistics services.  In tourism, Hong Kong can present itself as a launching pad for 
Mainland visitors of Southern China to ASEAN.  It can also work with ASEAN 
countries to promote the East Asian and Southeast Asian region as a destination for 
long-haul visitors.  In financial services, Hong Kong can provide funding for sub-
regional development projects organised by both ASEAN and China in less developed 
areas of ASEAN, i.e. the GMS.  In logistics services, Hong Kong’s world-class 
hardware and software infrastructure places the city in a good position to be a conduit 
for trade and investment between China and ASEAN.   
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4.38. With the broadening of the grouping over the years and the establishment by 
ASEAN of formal economic linkages with “supra-regional” partners such as China, 
Japan and South Korea, Hong Kong is well positioned to engage the economic 
partners from both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia and to serve as the bridge 
between them. 
 
(v) Various modes for Hong Kong to engage ASEAN  
 
4.39. The activities to strengthen Hong Kong’s formal and informal linkages with 
ASEAN can be arranged through existing official channels or new establishments. 
Naturally, Hong Kong has to take into consideration that these activities must be 
undertaken with respect to its political status as a part of China.    
 
4.40. Hong Kong is already a member of APEC and (Pan-Economic Cooperation 
Council) PECC, to which most ASEAN countries belong too.  These two forums can 
be used more frequently and effectively to forge closer linkages with ASEAN.  Hong 
Kong could use these channels to advocate or support initiatives and facilities to 
increase the economic interactions between these organisations and ASEAN.   
 
4.41. The Hong Kong government can also enhance the activities of its own trade-
related departments such as the HKETO and the HKTDC.  Hong Kong already has an 
economic and trade office in Singapore, and HKTDC has offices in Singapore, 
Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh City and Kuala Lumpur.  The HKETO office in Singapore 
currently functions, in collaboration with the HKTDC and the Hong Kong Tourism 
Board (HKTB), as a representative office of the Hong Kong government in ASEAN 
to promote Hong Kong as a business location and tourist destination in Asia.35  It can 
be used to forge closer bilateral trade and economic relationships with individual 
ASEAN states or ASEAN as a whole, and to facilitate investment activities of the 
Hong Kong business community in ASEAN.  On the latter, the Hong Kong 
government could look into the possibility of setting up more HKTDC offices within 
ASEAN (say in Indonesia and the Philippines) while expanding and upgrading the 
existing one.  The HKETO office could also consider working together with IE 
                                                 
35  Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Singapore website, “Functions of HKETO”, July 
2008.  Accessed at http://www.hketosin.gov.hk/aboutHKETO/mission.htm. 
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Singapore to jointly explore trade and investment opportunities for the business 
communities in both countries.   
 
4.42. Hong Kong could also start to have an active dialogue with the ASEAN 
Secretariat.  Under the leadership of the current Secretary General, there is strong 
motivation on the part of the Secretariat to deepen ASEAN’s relationship with not just 
China as a whole, but also individual provinces in China including Guangdong. This 
could provide an opportunity for Hong Kong to start the process of active engagement 
with ASEAN.  As other countries/regions such as the US, the EU and China have 
done, Hong Kong could consider an ASEAN Business Council as an early first step to 
engage with ASEAN.  Led by the private sector, and working on a non-official, non-
ministerial level basis, this is also consistent with the non-sovereign status of the 
HKSAR.  Over the years, Singapore has relied heavily and effectively on such non-
official setups to help engage the private sector in various ASEAN markets.   
 
4.43. Non-government trade and business associations in Hong Kong such as the 
Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce could also be encouraged to play a more 
active role in fostering ties with their counterparts in ASEAN.  As some provinces in 
China have been doing over the years, Hong Kong’s various business groups could 
consider organising more visits and even trade exhibitions to ASEAN to promote 
closer links on the regional level.  In this regard, these associations could seek ways to 
work with government bodies such as HKTDC to help facilitate the exchanges.  The 
HKTDC could be given more resources to help organise more regular trade 
delegations, led by senior government officials, to visit individual ASEAN countries.  
Such delegations which allow government officials and business people to work 
together in dealing with their foreign counterparts have been actively and effectively 
used by Singapore (under IE Singapore) and various Chinese provincial governments 
to strengthen bilateral business ties over the years.   
 
4.44. Besides Hong Kong’s own individual efforts, it could also expand its linkages 
with ASEAN through existing mechanisms.  The framework under the CAFTA is one 
important example as it provides a broad framework for more active economic 
cooperation between ASEAN and China as well as individual provinces and cities in 
China.  Hong Kong could explore with both Beijing and ASEAN how it could play a 
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separate and active role within that framework.  It could consider broadening the 
CAFTA to synergise with opportunities made available by CEPA.  A broadening of 
the FTA arrangements in future by including more service activities would be deemed 
consistent with ASEAN’s open regionalism approach and the same time beneficial to 
Hong Kong.  In any case, Singapore’s experience in broadening ASEAN’s economic 
cooperation framework to non-ASEAN countries can provide useful insights here. 
 
4.45. To make more effective use of other existing cooperation mechanisms 
between China and ASEAN such as the “ASEAN-plus” frameworks, the Hong Kong 
government could also consider joining the Chinese delegation as an observer or a 
member.  This could help provide a different perspective on as well as access to 
various trade and economic related opportunities in ASEAN. 
 
4.46. Hong Kong should also consider playing an active role in some of the sub-
regional economic groupings like the ADB-backed GMS Initiatives and the Beibu 
Gulf Rim Cooperation Framework.  The GMS Initiatives (which covers the South-
western provinces of China), in particular, have a well defined set of business and 
investment activities that Hong Kong may find relevant. As Singapore’s experience 
has shown, Hong Kong could engage in such activities on a bilateral basis, which 
could entail less bureaucratic hurdles. 
 
4.47. Besides the GMS, Hong Kong could also expand its bilateral engagement with 
other ASEAN states through C2C cooperation.  This type of cooperation, which is 
sometimes refer to as “sister cities” arrangement or “city twinning” cooperation, 
covers all possible forms of relationships between cities in two or more countries.36  
The areas of cooperation could range from economic, social and environmental policy 
and governance issues, to tourism and cultural exchanges.  The C2C arrangement also 
permits decentralised cooperation, allowing non-government players to be involved in 
activities between cities.  As a well-established city, Hong Kong possesses rich 
experiences in governance, as well as sustaining economic and social development.  It 
could consider starting such an arrangement with Singapore.  Both cities face similar 
challenges in many areas and a broad cooperation scheme like this could lead to an 
                                                 
36  United Nations Human Settlements Programme, “City-to-City Cooperation”, UN-Habitat 
(Vol.8, No.2, September 2002), pp.1-3. 
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active exchange of ideas between the official as well as non-government participants 
in various sectors.  The C2C arrangement could also provide an effective channel for 
Hong Kong to share its experience in building a sustainable city with those in the less-
developed ASEAN states.   
 
(vi)  Other Opportunities 
 
4.48. Given the general view that people from Hong Kong and ASEAN do not have 
sufficient knowledge and awareness about one another, it may warrant a more 
concerted effort by both sides to broaden exchanges outside the economic and 
business fields.  Cultural, educational, sports and social exchanges could play a big 
role in promoting understanding between the two peoples, which could contribute to 
the conduct of business.  An understanding of the huge cultural diversity among 
ASEAN countries and the need to approach business in each member country 
differently will go a long way in easing the challenges of building economic ties 
between the two. 
 
4.49. More specifically, there is also clear social rationale for Hong Kong to “go out 
to ASEAN”.  Maintaining a more distinctive identity for the Hong Kong people 
should be socially desirable, as China itself is a great family with wide social and 
cultural diversities.  While many young Hong Kong people are increasingly “going 
north” for education, employment and other opportunities in the Mainland, it may also 
be an added advantage for Hong Kong’s youths to “go south” to visit ASEAN 
countries, most of which are multi-racial and multi-cultural as well as English 
speaking, for a different cultural and social experience.  
 
4.50. To deepen its people’s understanding of the region, Hong Kong could, for 
instance, also consider offering courses of Southeast Asian or ASEAN studies at 
educational institutions of various levels.  Hong Kong universities could also be 
encouraged to undertake more joint research and exchange programmes with 
universities in ASEAN countries.   
 
4.51. Tourism provides an effective way to deepen understanding between two 
people, besides bringing about economic benefits.  The HKTB could be given more 
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resources to help promote tourism between Hong Kong and ASEAN.  Facilitating 
more budget flights between Hong Kong and ASEAN destinations could a go a long 
way in helping to realize such an objective. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 1     KEY ASEAN AGREEMENTS FOR POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, 1967 TO 2008 
 
YEAR AGREEMENTS OBJECTIVES 
1967 ASEAN Declaration 
The document declares the formation of ASEAN and 
exhorts the association to attain its economic, social 
and cultural aims through “joint endeavours” and 
“active collaboration and mutual assistance.” 
1971 
Zone of Peace, Freedom 
and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) 
Declaration 
This declaration commits all ASEAN members to 
“exert efforts to secure the recognition of and respect 
for Southeast Asia as a ZOPFAN, free from any 
manner of interference by outside powers,” and to 
“make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of 
cooperation, which would contribute to their strength, 
solidarity and closer relationship.”  
 
ZOPFAN also recognises “the right of every state, 
large or small, to lead its national existence free from 
outside interference in its internal affairs as this 
interference will adversely affect its freedom, 
independence and integrity.” 
1976 ASEAN Bali Concord 
The document states officially that member countries 
would expand political cooperation by adopting 
principles for regional stability and a programme of 
action for political cooperation.  The programme 
includes holding ASEAN summits among heads of 
government, soliciting commitment from ASEAN 
members to settle intraregional disputes “by peaceful 
means”, and devising future initiatives to improve the 
ASEAN machinery to strengthen political 
cooperation. 
1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
The treaty enshrines the following principles: mutual 
respect for one another’s sovereignty; noninterference 
in internal affairs; the peaceful settlement of 
intraregional disputes; and effective cooperation. 
 
The treaty also provides for a code of conduct for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, and mandates the 
establishment of a high council made up of 
ministerial representatives from the parties as a 
dispute-settlement mechanism. 
1976 
Agreement on the 
Establishment of the 
ASEAN Secretariat 
The agreement establishes the ASEAN Secretariat 
with the basic mandate of providing "for greater 
efficiency in the coordination of ASEAN organs and 
for more effective implementation of ASEAN 
projects and activities".   
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1977 ASEAN PTA 
The objective of this agreement is to expand intra-
ASEAN trade by extending trade preferences to one 
another.  The preferential level was originally set at 
10%.  This was, however, revised upwards to 25 % in 
1981 and to 50 % in 1987.  The products covered are 
not board-based but through group-by-group 
negotiations between partners.  Some sensitive trade 
items are excluded from the PTA arrangement and 
they are listed in the exclusion list. 
1980 ASEAN Resolution on Shipping and Trade 
The resolution aims to attain greater efficiency in 
ASEAN trade by promoting and strengthening 
ASEAN self-reliance and cooperation in shipping.  
This includes the expansion and modernisation of 
ASEAN merchant fleets and minimisation of 
restrictive measures for ASEAN vessels. 
1987 
Extension of Tariffs 
Treatment under the 
ASEAN PTA 
The extension aims to reduce the items in each 
member’s exclusion list under the ASEAN PTA by 
end 1992 to no more than 10 % of the number of 
items traded by them, and 50 % of intra-ASEAN 
trade value.  The items removed would have to be 
given a minimum Margin of Preference of 25 %.  The 
preferential level of the items that were already 
included in the PTA arrangement would be gradually 
increased to 50 % by 1992. 
1987 
Memorandum Of 
Understanding On 
Standstill And Rollback 
On Non-Tariff Barriers 
Among ASEAN Countries
The memorandum affirms that ASEAN member 
states will not introduce new or additional non-tariff 
measures which would impede intra-ASEAN trade.  
It also requires members to undertake measures to 
phase out or eliminate non-tariff measures in ASEAN 
trade and encourages ASEAN governments to 
introduce future economic policies that will facilitate 
intra-ASEAN trade. 
1992 
Framework Agreement On 
Enhancing ASEAN 
Economic Cooperation 
This agreement calls for more cohesive and effective 
performance of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation, 
and affirms ASEAN members’ agreement to establish 
and participate in the AFTA within 15 years.  A 
ministerial-level Council will be set up to supervise, 
coordinate and review the implementation of the 
AFTA. 
1992 
The Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff Scheme 
(CEPT) 
This scheme is the cornerstone of the AFTA as it 
aims to remove all tariff rates on all goods in ASEAN 
trade.  The goods that are affected are listed in the 
inclusion list and are mostly manufactured products.  
Goods that are not affected by the CEPT scheme are 
listed in the Temporary Exclusion List (TEL) and the 
sensitive and highly sensitive list, but they will be 
gradually phrased into the inclusion list by 2010 for 
the original ASEAN 6 members (i.e. Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand), and by 2017 for the new ASEAN members 
(i.e. CLMV). 
 
For products in the inclusion list, ASEAN 6 members 
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are required to have all tariff rates removed by 2010.  
The newer members are to follow suit by 2015. 
1995 
ASEAN Framework 
Agreement on Services 
(AFAS) 
The AFAS aims to eliminate restrictions to trade in 
services and enhance cooperation in services within 
ASEAN.  The service sector selected by the 
agreement are (1) air transport;  (2) business services; 
(3) construction;  4) financial services;  (5) maritime 
transport;  (6) telecommunication;  and (7) tourism.  
1997 ASEAN Vision 2020 
This is ASEAN’s guiding economic vision.  It calls 
for the creation of "a stable, prosperous and highly 
competitive ASEAN Economic Region in which 
there is a free flow of goods, services and 
investments, a freer flow of capital, equitable 
eco-nomic development and reduced poverty and 
socio-economic disparities."   
 
The document pledges to build the ASEAN 
Economic Region by adhering to previous ASEAN 
economic initiatives or agreements such as AFTA as 
well as the introduction of new areas of economic 
cooperation in areas such as tourism, investment, 
human resource development, energy, science and 
technology, etc.  
 
After its adoption, the vision is echoed repeatedly in 
all ASEAN documents. 
1998 ASEAN Investment Area 
This is a coordinated effort to make ASEAN a 
competitive, conducive and liberal investment area.  
Some of the measures under this scheme include 
programmes to ease investment flow within ASEAN, 
opening up of all industries for investment to ASEAN 
investors by 2010 and to all investors by 2020.  But 
some industries as specified in the TEL and the 
Sensitive List will be opened gradually.  Other 
measures aim to promote freer flows of capital, 
skilled labour, professional expertise and technology 
amongst the member countries. 
1998 Hanoi Plan of Action 
The Action Plan is the first in a series of plans of 
action designed to help the realisation of the goals of 
the ASEAN Vision 2020. It is a six-year action plan 
(1999 to 2004) that contains concrete measures to be 
taken in 10 key areas, including (1) strengthening 
macroeconomic and financial cooperation;  (2) 
enhancing greater economic integration;  (3) 
developing of science and technology;  (4) promoting 
of environmental protection;  (5) increasing 
cooperation in human resource training;  (6) 
addressing the social impact of the financial crisis; 
(7) strengthening cooperation in security and peace; 
(8) enhancing ASEAN’s support for peace in the 
international order;  (9) improving ASEAN’s 
international image and  (10) improving existing 
ASEAN mechanisms for cooperation.  
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2000 e-ASEAN Agreement 
The Agreement takes a holistic approach to achieving 
digital readiness and acts as a binding mechanism for 
actions in six areas, namely connectivity, local 
content, a seamless environment for electronic 
commerce, a common marketplace for information 
and communication technology, goods and services, 
human resource development and e-governance. 
2001 Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) 
The IAI aims to accelerate the integration of market 
diversity and the transitional economies of the 
CLMV.  It includes a Work Plan with 48 projects to 
be introduced on a sub-regional level.  The goal of the 
plan is to ensure dynamic and sustained growth of the 
GMS and prosperity of its people. 
2002 ASEAN Tourism Agreement 
The main objective of the agreement is to enhance 
cooperation in the tourism industry among ASEAN 
members.  Measures under this agreement include 
(1) cooperating in facilitating travel into and within 
ASEAN;  (2) reducing restrictions to trade in tourism 
and travel services among ASEAN members;  (3) 
establishing an integrated network of tourism and 
travel services in order to maximise the 
complementary nature of the region’s tourist 
attractions;  (4) enhancing the development and 
promotion of ASEAN as a single tourism destination 
with world-class standards, facilities and attractions; 
(5) enhancing mutual assistance in human resource 
development and strengthening cooperation to 
develop, upgrade and expand tourism and travel 
facilities and services in ASEAN; and  (6) creating 
favourable conditions for the public and private 
sectors to engage more deeply in tourism 
development, intra-ASEAN travel and investment in 
tourism services and facilities. 
2003 ASEAN Bali Accord II 
This accord lays out a platform for the establishment 
of a regional community that includes the creation of 
a single market by 2020.  The establishment will be 
underpinned through the realisation of three pillars of 
cooperation, namely the creation of the AEC, the 
ASEAN Security Community (ASC), and the 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). 
2003 East ASEAN Growth Area 
This is a sub-regional economic cooperation 
involving Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Malaysia in establishing a growth region.  It aims to 
bridge the development gap among ASEAN 
members.  The development projects in this growth 
area include those in the tourism, transportation and 
agro-industry sectors.  They will involve the 
participation of the private sector. 
2004 Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) 
The VPA is a six-year plan (2004-2010) which 
succeeds the Hanoi Plan of Action in realising the end 
goal of the ASEAN Vision and the Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord II.  It focuses on deepening regional 
integration and narrowing the development gap 
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within ASEAN, particularly with regard to the least 
developed member countries.  Summit leaders agreed 
to establish the ASEAN Development Fund to 
support the implementation of VAP and future action 
programmes. 
2007 
Cebu Declaration on the 
Acceleration of the 
Establishment of an 
ASEAN Community by 
2015 
The declaration affirms ASEAN's strong commitment 
towards accelerating the establishment of an ASEAN 
Community by 2015 along the lines of ASEAN 
Vision 2020 and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord 
II, in the three pillars of the ASC, AEC and ASCC.  
The declaration also notes ASEAN’s commitment to 
further expanding its engagement with its dialogue 
partners and other parties, and believes that such 
interaction will assist ASEAN in its integration 
efforts to achieve the ASEAN Community by 2015. 
2008 ASEAN Charter 
The ASEAN Charter is about giving ASEAN a 
stronger and collective voice in the international body 
and ensuring plans endorsed by its leaders are 
effectively implemented according to timelines spelt 
out.  It calls for the setting up of ASEAN Community 
Councils covering political and security, economic 
and socio-cultural spheres.  It also ensures the 
implementation of decisions of the summit, 
coordinates the work of the different sectors and 
submits reports to ministers and leaders.  
 
In addition, each ASEAN member state will now 
appoint a permanent representative to the grouping 
with the rank of ambassador to be based in Jakarta. 
 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat; IE Singapore 
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GLOSSARY 
 
AFTA 
 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement is a free trade arrangement by the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations.  It was signed on 28 January 1992.  The primary 
goal of the agreement is to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers within 
ASEAN to increase the grouping’s competitive edge and foreign investment 
inflow into ASEAN. 
 
ASEAN 
 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is a geo-political and economic 
organisation of 10 countries from Southeast Asia.  It was formed on 8 August 
1967.  Originally, there were only five member countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  Brunei became the sixth member in 
1984.  Vietnam joined in 1995.  Laos and Myanmar joined in 1997, while 
Cambodia joined in 1999. 
 
ATF 
 
The ASEAN Tourism Forum is a regional cooperative platform to promote 
the attractiveness of the region as a tourist destination collectively, as well as 
to reinforce cooperative ties among the various sectors of the ASEAN tourism 
industry. 
 
ASEAN-plus Framework 
 
The ASEAN-plus framework provides a platform to help build mutual 
understanding, confidence and solidarity between ASEAN and its dialogue 
partners.  The topics of discussion within the framework include politics, 
security, economic cooperation and social and cultural exchanges.  The 
ASEAN+3 framework which consist of ASEAN state members, China, Japan 
and South Korea is the most prominent example of the ASEAN-plus 
framework. 
 
ABMI 
 
Asia Bond Market Initiatives is one of the major ASEAN+3 financial 
initiatives introduced after the Asian financial crisis.  It is meant to reduce 
regional economies’ dependence on dollar-based financing and to improve on 
the use of savings within the region, thereby reducing ASEAN countries’ 
vulnerability to swings in the values of local currencies against the dollar. 
 
Beibu Gulf Rim Economic Circle 
 
The Beibu Gulf Rim Economic Circle or the Pan-Beibu/Tonkin Gulf 
Economic Cooperation Zone is an initiative by the Chinese government to 
increase economic cooperation and development between China’s Yunnan and 
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Guangxi provinces with the ASEAN members of Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar 
and Cambodia. 
 
CAFTA 
 
The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement is a free trade arrangement 
between China and ASEAN.  The negotiation began in November 2001.  The 
aim is to create a zero-tariff China-ASEAN market.  CAFTA has been 
targeted to come into force in 2010 for the six original ASEAN members 
(Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and in 
2015 for the other four (Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam). 
Implementation of the framework agreement would occur in stages. 
 
CLMV 
 
 Please see GMS 
 
 
CMI 
 
The Chiang Mai Initiative is an initiative under the ASEAN+3 framework 
which aims to create a network of Bilateral Swap Arrangements (BSAs) 
among ASEAN+3 countries, to help the countries respond effectively to 
speculative currency attacks.. 
 
EDB 
 
The Economic Development Board is the lead government agency responsible 
for planning and executing strategies to enhance Singapore’s position as a 
global business and investment centre.  The agency design and deliver 
solutions that create value for investors and companies in Singapore.   
 
GLC 
 
Government Linked Companies could be considered a unique Singapore 
invention.  These are firms in which Temasek Holdings, the investment 
holding arm of the Singapore Government, has substantial stakes.  Since 
Singapore's independence in the mid-1960s, the GLCs have played and 
continue to play a strategic and important role in the economic development of 
Singapore. 
 
GMS 
 
The Greater Mekong Subregion comprises Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 
Thailand, Vietnam and Yunnan Province of China. 
 
IAI 
 
The Initiative for ASEAN Integration programme was introduced by ASEAN 
in 2001.  It aims to accelerate the integration of more advanced economies 
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within ASEAN and the transitional economies of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar 
and Vietnam.  It includes a Work Plan with 48 projects to be introduced on a 
sub-regional level.   
 
IE Singapore 
 
International Enterprise Singapore is the lead agency under the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry spearheading the development of Singapore's external 
economic wing.  Its mission is to help Singapore companies venture overseas 
and to promote international trade.  IE Singapore also aims to work to position 
Singapore as a base for foreign businesses to expand into the region in 
partnership with Singapore-based companies. 
 
 
MTI 
 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry is a ministry of the Government of 
Singapore that directs the formulation and implementation of policies related 
to the trade and industry of Singapore. 
 
 
SIJORI 
 
The Singapore Johor Riau Growth Triangle was introduced in the early 1990s 
to promote economic integration between Singapore, the Riau Islands of 
Indonesia and the State of Johor in Malaysia.  It main aim was to help 
facilitate better allocation and usage of production resources among the three 
regions, including the relocation of Singapore’s labour-intensive industries 
such as the textile, furniture and electronic industries to the other two 
participating countries where they can enjoy low cost advantage. 
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